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The purpose of this thesis ia to compare methods of credit anal• 
yais used by Dun & Bradstreet with those used by commercial banks. The 
process by which a credit deeiaioa is formed by any institution may be 
reaarded aa comprising three steps: the collection of data, the analysis 
of the data, and the interpretatiog of data which affects the final de• 
cision. This thesis will deal only with the analysis and interpretation 
divisions. Analysis aDd interprtatation 1uuest that there may be quali• 
tative factors to be considered in a study of credit. Therefore, the 
credit analyst and manaaeaent in the role of both creditor and debtor 
will be diacuaeed. 
Dun & Bradstreet analyaea and rates merchants accordina to 
their ability and experience 1n meatiq trade obli&ationa. Trade creclit 
is puually abort term., or leaa thaa one year in duration. Comlaarcial 
bank analysis includes inte:mediate aad long term loans. This thesis is 
cacerucl with short run lencliD&, comparaltle in duration to true creclit. 
O'ler the years a great many tools of analysis have been prof• 
ferecl by various an.al.yata. Aacm& these are the Where-sot. Where-gone 
Statement, ratio analysis, an4 The Robert MOrris Associates lndex.l This 
study will attempt to ascertain which of the many tools are now in use 
by the v~ious analysts. 
1ao'bert Morrie Aaaociatea, 1961 Stati!!Bt Sty4ies (Philadel• 
phia: The Natioul u.ociatiou of Bak Loan Officers and Credit Men, 
Copyrtaht 1962) , Section 11. 
A further area of inveatiaa&lon ia that of the interpretation 
or d.eoiaion. which may answer any one or all of three questiona. The 
first queation is whether or not any credit abould be granted. The aec• 
ODd question la how large a line or amount of dollar credit abould be 
aranted. This question may be •dified to decide the amount of increaae 
or deere.,. in a case when analyain& an existing line. The thir4 quea• 
tlon uks what the tems of the loan will be. Or41narily the tel'U of 
a loan will ltlpulate the duratloa and coat of the loan. If the credit 
ia a trade obligation. the coat of the leaa is included in the mark•up. 
Occasionally, a cash discount is IJ'aDted by the aeller • thia cliacount 
may be considered a further colt of the loan when the diacount ia not 
eurci•e4 by the buyer. In the caN of a bait loan, the cost is measured 
in terma of the intereat charae. Baak loana also may have restrictions 
relative to working capital ud.nimulu, dividend paymenta, and minimum ae• 
count balancea. Such reatrictiona are utually placed on intermediate 
8Qcl lona ten loana. Intenaediate and loq tam loans will be omitted 
from conaideration becauae the theaia ia limited to abort run conaiclera• 
tiona t:elative to duration of a creclit. 
The iaveatiaation will atudy the decision factor only as it 
relates to the araatina of credit. The deoiaion relative to the sranttna 
of credit uy require 1110re than a simple Yea or No answer. Aa far as the 
bankt are concerned, all decisiona fall within one of three categories. 
The lllOat favorable cateaory it a grant of credit on an unaecurecl basis. 
The aeeond eatesory ia a favorable decision on a secured basis. The 
third catepry is an unfavorable decision where no credit ia sranted 
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under any conditions. 
The size of a loan iD dollars affects the credit decision by a 
l:umk. The bank aeuerally seta up limits bqond which a given account 
cannot borrow. The limits indicate the IUXi:aum amounts that can be 
loaned to the account on either an untecured or secured basis. An at• 
tempt has been made to ascertain what the cutoff point is between secured 
and unsecured bank credit. 
Decisions by Dun & Bradstreet analy1ts do not place reatric• 
tiona on the twa of credit, whether secured or unsecured, as trade 
credit i1 rarely offered on a secured basta. The agency decision is 
baaed on paying habits and ability. . It places the risk on a scale with 
five sipificant points: neellent, aood, fair, Uaited, and blank ( "' ). 
The scale is more fully explained in the chapters to follow deacribina 
Dun & Bradstreet. 
There are some qualitative factors which have a bearina on any 
analysis and decision. The moat itlportaat oue to be considered is the 
analyst himself. The iuvestiaation will attempt to discover what skills 
aad per~al traits are needed to make a aan a &ood analyst. The selec• 
tion and traiAing of the analyst, then, will be of prime importance. 
Manaaement preaaurea affectina the analyat'a work will be discuaaed. 
Finally, the attitudes of business manaaementa toward beina 
rated will be iuvestiaated. 
Liaitationa: 
The field of credit can be aplit, for convenience, into two 
broad areu, bank credit aad me~tile credit. Either area in itself 
11 a very broad topic and far beyond the scope of a thesis such as the 
one at hand. As a result it ia neces1ary to limit the scope of the the• 
aia. 
The banks uDder consideration are limited to commercial banks 
which are permitted to lend on a 1bort•term basis. A further limitation 
relative to the banks is that the Greater Boaton area is the only area 
cona14ered. The study dwells on UllHcured ctredit, principally, but the 
realm of security is investiaated to the extent that there is a differ• 
ence in the type of analysis. Short run cre41t ia by definition credit 
of leas than one year• s duration. It is self•liquidatina, which means 
that the 1084• purcha1ed with the loaa are aaaured of beiDa sold and e~ 
verte4 iato caah within a abort pertod of time or before the date on 
which the leader auat be paid. Lcma-tera credit is usually uaecl in con• 
nection with the purchaae of capital p041a, and repayaent is depea:a.4ent 
upon the recovery of depreciation charaea as well as profitable opera• 
tiona. 
Mercantile credit departments may vary in size from one man 
opuaU.ona to a line 8Qd at.aff oraaniaation of many people, as would be 
fouad, ~ ..ample, in the laraer companies of the steel and electrical 
aoods industries. The professional's professional, Dun & Brad1treet, 
will be use4 as a model for the mercantile credit analyst. In the opi~ 
ion of the author, this aaency repre88Dts the ideal in credit analysis 
when compared to the typical business credit department analysia. Also, 
only the very larae companie1 would be in a position to do as thorou&h 
a job as does the aaeney. 
- s -
The theaia will 1M furt.ber Uait.ecl to coui4trl'atiou of the Dull 
& lradatl'eet IIUl)'t.ical repel"&. Thia l'epos't cova"a buaiuaaea with net 
Wl"th :la aceaa of $125,000. It alao covers all can"iua a.&bject 10 In-
clepatmeat alao iaauea l'eporta • «*lac INaineaaee where the inquil")' 
rate by ••ribera to the Dun & lr.atreet aenice 1a hiJb. 
It ie alao 110tecl that aalytlul reporta ue DUll & B'l'acletreet' e 
fiaeat aad ..- paiutald.q pro4tact. 'lheee repo7."ta tliffu &Oil the 
tea4ecl to aaalJH the riek a well u report the facta. The replR c_.. 
mei"Cial repel't 1e a-wally a coaapllatioft of fMta, with aaalyeia betq 
aetchJ at beat. 
At thie poiat it ie e1piff.caat to a.ek, "What is cl'edit 1" The 
...,. to the que.etioa will tlepeM up011 the poeitlcm takea 1:ty the re.,_... 
4eat. Per iutaace, a lawye..- aia,ht ue the wo..-a of McLeod: "A cre4it ia 
1•• ecaael'ce, or ec.._S.Ce ie the l'i&ht which oae per80D, the cl'ecSitor, 
baa to ...,.1 aaot,her pel'801l, tu clebtOI', to pq o• cSo IMOtld.aa."2 The 
cJ:eclitol.' al&bt ue IAvuae•'• defta1tioll: "Credit is the exch8ll.p of an 
actual reality aaawt a futun probabiltc,-,n or a "aale Oil tl'Wit."3 
3 X.... 8lllll lell..,tre, .2l• cit., p. S. 
Aoother clefiaition ia, "Mercantile creclit 18 that power 1nhereot ia the 
p~apective borrower which iDducea aaother peraou to tranafer sooct• or 
services f.r& the preaent on the pr.tae of future payaent. n4 The author 
favors the latter definition as it it more comprehenaive, and ia uaable 
before the actual arant of credit. 
It ia important for the purpoaea of this theai1, to diatinauiah 
between baak credit and aercantile credit. The moat important clifferenee 
is that commercial credit" ••• ia extenclecl for profit on aoocta sold rather 
tho fos- pl'ofit in the fora of interett ••• , " at is the case of b8Dk ere• 
clit.5 The two te .... at used in thia thesis can be considered interchange-
able except for this distinction. 
A coatraat between interoal aaalyaia and external analysis is 
alto in Ol'dft• lD.temal aaa.l7aia refera to all inveatiption, especially 
financial. which it directly related to &he enterprise in queation. Data 
uaecl in ·the inveatip.tion couailtl of the OOIIIp&n)'• 1 finmc:ial atateaeuta, 
inveattaational facta about the coaapan7'• put record, and antecedent in-
fomatien about the company's mauq .... t. btemal analysis, on the oth• 
er haad, takes into conaicleration faotera other than thoae pertaiuina eli• 
rectly to the enterprise be ina aalyaed. lump lea of external aaalyaia 
are, compariaoa with aimtlu c011paaiea in ~he iiU!uatry, compariaon of c.om-o 
poaite atatemeata for the induatry, 8Dd compariaona with the economy. 
4 Irona and Bellemore, .22. .ill• p. 5 • 
5CEf41t MIBtleat !iRAitls• A publication of the Hatioual. 
Aaaociat:ion of Cre41t Hea (Homewoocl, IlU.aoia: lU.charcl D. Inriu, Inc •• 
1158) P• 9. 
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Fuaetions of Credit ADalysis: 
The functions of credit analysis can best be approached by ~ 
awerina two questiODs. Firet, "Will he payf" which is indicative of a 
debtor• a deeire to paJ. A debtor 111&7 have the fund& to meet- a tracie 
obliaation, but this cloea not necessuU7 Man that he will diacharae 
his obU.ption. On the other hacl, he c&Q not pay when funds are lackiq. 
Analyais on which to base a decision oa whether a debtor will pay comes 
from two aoUl'cea, accordiq to Roy A. Foulke. The first is "antecedent 
information, which is the full record of the individuals associated to-
aether in operatina a business entezprise, aad the record of the business 
enterprise, itself, since inception."6 The second aource is, uinvesti~ 
tioaal facta, which cover the wide ranae of information obtaiued from 
thorouah periodic bank acl tracie investiption."7 
Given an affi~tive deciaion that a proapectlve debtor will 
paJ his obU.ptione, thea a second queati.on, "Can he p&J'l'' muet be an• 
swered. Neecllees to aa7, if the aaawer to the first question is neaa• 
tive, no further couicleration of the prospective debtor should be under• 
taken, as tbe element of risk beco~~es toe blah. The second question is 
• ..,hat euler to answer thaa the first • u there are quanttative measures 
which aid the anal)'st in his decision. Aecordi.Da to Foulke, a vice-presi• 
dent of Dun & Bradstreet, the anawer to this question is derived from 
6:1o7 A. Foulke ancl Herbert V. Prochnow, l]:actical Bpk Credit 
(New York: Prentice Hall, Inc:., 1f39h p. 168. 
7 Ibid. 
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.. fiuacial iDfO'C'IIat.:tcm, which reneaeata available finaacial data. When 
adequate :f.afol'llatioa ia available, the analysis may cover (a) CCIIp&rative 
balaace sheets, (b) operatins details aDd eupplemeatary facta, (c) sur• 
plua accouata, (d) bud&eta set up in atioipation of future operation•, 
and (e) trial balances.n8 The secoacl aource. "imreatiaational fact.a," 
aida in the decision to the questioa, "Can he pay?" 
"Will he pay!'' and "Can he pq?" are aeneral question• which 
muat he answered. Benj•u' has ua.4ertakea to break dowa the fuuct:Lone 
of credit aaalyeie :f.a more specific terme as far aa fiDancial analysis is 
concerned. He lists six etepe to be undertaken. 
1. Determine the actual conclltion aa to liquidatin& 
value. 
2. Determine whether accounts receivable, imrentory, 
and liabilitie1 are in proper relation to tales. 
3. Determiae whether the debtor ia relyina too heavily 
on cre41t.or or borrowed capital. 
4. Provide a mediua by which an individual balance sheet 
can be meaa\l$ed or compared with others in the induttry • 
.5. Discover possibly rdaleadiq or false statements. 
6. Provide a True CUneat latio oa which loans or credit 
aay be predieated. 
8 Foulke ami Proclmow, .!2• cit., p. 168. 
91uaene 8. Benjamill, P!:ast&sa1 Credit Ap!l:Jsis lox.: B@ !!A 
ttM• SEd&!: "ft· AcftUilsaHf. IpyMW•. Bueipya lfboola a MttclEJ• (3rd Uitioa& 0 11 th AYeau, N• Ynk, lew York: lu&eae J. Beajain, 
1939), p. 1. 
Althouah the aaerit of the a:lx. at epa will aot be diacuaaed at thia time • 
expluatlon of Benjain1 a "True Cu.nent llatio" is in order. 
The current ratio is 4efin.H variously u the total of current 
uaeta divind by cuneut U.oilild.es. "The hiaher the current ratio, 
the p:eater the equity in cuneut o&- tr .. :lna usats of a budnaas eud 
prohetlou of the current debt.""' Jenjaia would aaree with th:la atate-
llel\t ae far aa it aoes. He :lmpliu that -.u.nta ahcnm on finaacial state-
~s, especially the valuu for receivables and btventory • are open to 
quuti.cm aa4 should be tested to aee thu they " ••• are in fair and proper 
proportion to salea ..... ll ODly afte&- aueh necessary adjuetaaDtt would 
one cd.ve at a True Current lat:lo. 
Sounea of Woru.tion: 
lnfonaat:lon relative to the vu:tou tools of aaalya:ls haa been 
aathenci from nuaei'Oua ltooka &Del other pwltcat:tcma. as noted in the b:ll>-
U.op:apby. A ba.ck&rowd kaowlecl&e of the field of mercantile credit was 
aatne4 by the author throu&h one year's employment with Dun & Bradstreet 
as an analytical reporter. 
The information on the methode of analysis at Dun & Bradstreet 
aa well as the comments relative to the different rattnaa were obtained 
throuah personal :laterview with three aaalyats chosen with the idea of 
aentaa differtna opin:l.cma. Thole interviewed incluciecl the oldaat and 
yowqe1t t.n yeua of service, ad a third 8D&lyst couUered by his 
1°cre41t baearch Pouud&ti.oa, CJ!4it M@R!I!!'!!t Haa4ltm* (llome-
wood, llltno:l.a: JU.chud D. IIV:ln, Inc •• 1tS8), p. 221. 
1~enj•:l.o., .u.. sit.. , p. S. 
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co-werkera to be an "authority." 
The information about ~e various banka was aathered almost en-
tirely by peraonal interview. Those interviewed were aenerally the direc-
tors of the credit departments, where credit analysis was in fact depart• 
mentaU.aed. An effort wu macte to include both urban and suburban banks, 
and amona the urban will be found the laraest bank in Boston, two of in• 
te~iate size. and one which ia comparatively saall. The three suburban 
banks were smaller in alee than the intermediate urban banks, but were 
aona the laraer suburban banks. The u.aea of those interviewed with 
their respective titles and affiliationa, appear in the biblioaraphy. 
JWIIC CMIASTI BITWID BAlK AND ME&CANTlLE CREDIT 
The baaic puJ:pOae of d.l 'buatneaa, be it manufac~ins. aalea, 
or aervice ia to earn a profit for the owoera of the bustneas. Almoat 
all buaineaaea offer crecU.t in aarae fom, but banks and other lendina in-
atitutiona U'e UDiflue in that loanin& fvad.a 11 their major function. In 
coutrut, moat other enterpriaea offec credit only as an incidental func-
tion. Moat buaineaaea offer credit u an iacentive to the cuatomer to 
buy, ao, for competitive reaaona, it • ._. likely that the credU functioo. 
will cootiuue, thouah not aa a major purpoae for bein& in busineaa. 
Differences between the tJPt of credit offered by baaka aad the 
t:Jpe olfuecl by mercbaata appeu in a 1l11111Jer of aapecta. Theae are the 
D.\llllber of tr8Daact1ona occurriq, the oiiDOW'lt of cretiit extended, the 
mark•up atven, the riak involved., ancl the ecOUOIIIJ of the coUiltry. 
Numbu of Traaaactiona: 
Wha uaf.na the bak u a-.... of creclit,. bo~:rowers uav.ally 
make oae loan in a aiven year, ol'df.auily coiueidilll with a peak aeascm. 
The loaaa AJ:e for the .oat part ahort·t~ aud aelf•liquidatina. A c~ 
pUI.J which lUIUlfacturea akia ia au example. The aelU.na season foJ: akta 
beatna about October and enda in feltruary or March, a ped.od of aix l1.!Dilthe. 
The maaufacturer keepa his plant open the )'eal' uound but has very little 
i.KOme cluiD& t:be off•aeqou months, April to Septaaber. In order to con• 
t:l.aue u.nufacturin& duriua the low-iDCOIH 11011tba, he borrowa funda which 
will 'be coaverted into inventory to be eold durin& the followtna aellin& 
aeuon. Aa receipts froa aalea appear in Bovaaber, the manufacturer 
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baatns to repay the loan, which ahould be paid out bJ the end of the 
aelU.na seuon. The tent of the loan b leas than one Jear, and repay-
ment coincidea with the peak season. 
The merchant haa the ability to "set id' and "set out" of a 
credit arranaement in a relatively •hort period of time etmply by refuaina 
to sell on other than a strai&bt caah basis. For example, a meat Whole-· 
aaler will supply his e•atomera on the averaae of once per week. His 
sell ina tents are net weekly, so that on any aiven day, the wholesaler 
will have only one fifty-aecond of an entire year's sales out on credit. 
At the end of each week he collec.ta his coats, expeues, and profits for 
the precedina week. In contrast, the beuka aenerally lend for periods of 
at least 30 days, and more often than not, considerably longer periods. 
The banker cannot discontinue credit with the eaae and facility of the 
merchant. Merchants, then, take many ,..11 risks as contrasted with the 
fewer larae ones assumed by banks. 
Size: 
Debtors aenerally conftae their business to one bank, or a very 
few banks when their business is of such siae as to require the banks to 
spread the rilk. Usina the lki manufacturer as an eumple, it can be 
seen that the loan will start with a ..all advance in April or May and 
will build up to a peak in October or lfovember. Durin& the intervenina 
months, there ia no possibility of the manufacturer dischargtns his obli• 
aatlon, as he baa couverted the lean into aki imrentory. llepa)'lllent can• 
not be ma4e until the inventory 11 aold and the IU.Ilufaeturer baa received 
pa)'llleat fa>Oill his customers. ludivUual bank loans tend to be laraer than 
mft'eentUe creclits due to the coaaeat.ration of aeed for credit prior to 
the peak se.asoa. 
Debtor• in their dealtnaa with ~chant• purchase inventory 
&011 a 11UIIbe1.' of suppliers due priD,oipallJ t.o the diversification of the 
it-. to be pu"hased. Also, de tors buy on credit tems on a number of 
occaaiolll du1.'i111 tlle ;year, so that the coet of inventory is spread amoq 
several creditors. The ~~eat vboleeal_. sella to Dl&1:IJ customers each week. • 
so hie credit ri*s are well cU.veraifiecl. The chance of one customer de-
faultiq is always preseut, but the chance of all cuetomers defaulting is 
veJ:J 8111411. Eveu if one cuatcaer Uu default, the wholesaler ia looaina 
oul;y a small portion of his earntaaa for the week, or a small portion of 
an eatire year's sales to the default ina cuatoaaer. The wholesaler' • cre-
dits are therefore amaller 8Dd acatte.ed on an individual basis. 
Baaks won on a taaJ:IiD or IRUk•up which is characteriaticall;y 
6 per c.eut or lese, depeadina upon the aature of the loan and the aeueral 
level of iDterest rates. If ~ baak loaned the ski manufacturer $10,000 
for the eat ire year • the incoae would be ouly $600. This $600 rauat cover 
all admf.Diatra•tve expenses, iatereat on depoaU:ors • money, 81Ml prof ita 
to equity stockhol4ers. In addition, an a.uat must be set aaide to pro-
vide for lou.s which are clefaultecl. 
ln cont:raat, mel'cbants won with m.uaina often up to 40 per cent. 
An.cl to uke the pictue m<n:e favorable, the mark•up is rarely on an annual 
baa is. If the meat vholesalu sella a customer $10,000 wol'th of merchan-
dise ia oae year, he would be aelliq about $200 worth (actually $10,000 
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• 52 • $192.30) pc vaek. U. IUlrk•up u oer&aial.J ...,. thea aix pc 
ceac. lf a flpre of 10 ,_ ceat 18 ••••••• the wbolualer would col• 
1eet a1aout $20 (101 of $200) per 1felk , .. ,.,. ..,_... aad pnflta. At 
tbe -.4 of ~ veeka, he W1l14 ban oolleeted $200 (10 tiaetl $20) tovuda 
hla •••- _. pnfU.e, aad _, defMilt '-1 a cuac;...- would lun Mer& 
CG~ftn41ty pi'WlMia 'tfMkl1 iac1•1• A ltaak'l lOll f.:a cue of default, ea 
tM ~ had, wou1tl 1M t.M total _,.,.. of tbe w•at.rd.aa loa Nlauea, 
wbloh wuU ..-all)' k c.eui4anll1J _.. &baa the $600 Ml'pa. 
Tb.e bat& ...... 1a • fU.Saz7 MfMlC)t 1u l:hae; it ... .,,. cle-
poalta wbJ.ch t.c J.e.a at ~t. !he fuada ... , 1M l'et.w:aed to tbe 
d.,_lcon ..-&uall)'. Aa a tW.e fuMe •• leaed out b7 baaka fw a 
flud perl.ocl of tille, ...-a~.&, thiJr&J MJ• • loapr. &ecaue of the 
coah.ct\1411 aatUI"e of tba to., ~ l'eqaf.zoed at tlle eacl of 30, 60, 
90 claJ'• • 1....-) ca. Mllkl _.. •t •1• to "let ut• aa4 "set out .. u 
ntedllJ ... tbe .... - .... 
AI a.otetl pwioualJ tile cW.l• ...,... a bak ri.lka 18 hf.ahe.l' 
in a aJ.YeD "-•tia ~ •• .......-11a cl'edf.h, ao there la a anaca-
,.a•&•1 loM dollantae per tl'_.tloa. Ia _.. s-eral te-., the 
baka offw Mra tlellc cn4U fow 1.,.... ,_iMI of t.S.. for leaa _..., 
thaD do the IIUCltatl. 
Mel'cbata loa tlwiw _.. &a the fol'll of aetre•tlle a-Mit _, 
the d.lk ... ...n ...u., ou••lra .. ......S.lJ f.a bettu ffMacf.al 
caad....._ thaD '** .. ....,.... the Met wbolualw _,. have a cut .. 
ddalt, 1tua he .Ul 1oM oal7-. .,..., nceivalea, w $200 ill the 
.. 15 • 
illuatratton above. The riak factor ia lower for the merchant becauae 
the credits are amaller and of aborter duration than the b.nka'. 
'the lcOilODIY: 
Depreasiou, or l"eCeaaiOD in preaeat•day noaenclature, and infla• 
tion alao have their effect a on the typu of credit extended. In cle-
preaaed timea cuatomers of the bank are ofteu at their peak need for fua4a, 
"to ticle thea over." While baaka adaittedly curtail loan• to a certain 
extent, they do contiaue to len4 moaey in bad times when ritks are hiper. 
Uaually the baaks beain to look for aecurtty where loans in the past were 
unsecured. Secured loans are curtailed by allowina leas credit on the 
same dollar aecurtty value. lor ....,le, if the alti manufacturer waa bor• 
row:l.ua on an unsecured baa is in previous times, the b8Dk a:l.lht now ask for 
security, perhapa a pledae on the lavea.tory purcbaaed with the loan. If 
be waa already ustna inventory for security, it is likely that the bank 
waa loaniq the $10,000 on the pleclae of inventory with a value of $12.,500. 
The borrower was &ettina 80 per cent of the value of the collateral. The 
bank may now drop the percentaae to 60 per cent, ao that the loan value 
of a $12,500 inventory is only $7,500. Durin& times of inflation, the 
proceaa ia reveraeda ao that a loan which formerly required aecurity may 
be obtaine4 on an . unsecured baaia. The loan value of the inventory 1:1181 
alao be increased to 80 per cent fl'OIIl the former depressed value of 60 
per cent, at the deecretion of the bauk • a loan committee. It abould be 
noted that the federal and state aover.aments attempt to reaulate the 
81110\lllt of credit outataudina at a atvea time throuah the Federal B.eaerve 
Bank aa4 aimtlar state replatory bocU.ea. Preaent replationa apply to 
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the ratio of the dollar amount of loaa to the dollar amount of deposits 
and/or cppital. The ratio of secured and unsecured loans to deposits 
and/or capital ia also reaulated. The various sovenment reaulationa 
presently apply to the loans of a aiven baak in the aasreaate only. For 
that reason the effect of aoveroment reaulation on loans will not be die-
cuaaed fu~ther in this theaia. 
Merchants h&ve more flexibility of control over the riak flue• 
tuationa due to chanaes in the buaiDeae economy. Durin& depreaaed times, 
all firms curtail buytaa to aa.e exteat in aaticipation of decreased de• 
aan4 for their product and a complimentary decreaae in aales. If the 
fis:m ia able to control eapa.aea ao that aales do not drop faster than 
upeaaea. thea the merchant will 1N ia aood position to discontinue cre-
dit oa poorer credit risks. The further decrease in sales will not sub-
atantially hurt the profit pictue. The mercantile tranaactiona are uau-
ally completed in 30 daya or leaa • and the merchant thus has mt.n:e freedom 
to pull out of a weak credit dtuatioa than the bake. The banks may 
have aareemu.ta which exteDd f•r ped.oda excaedin& one year and be unable 
to curtail credit until temiaatioa of auch asreements. Durin& aood times, 
merchants loosen up on the credit reina. They often take on new riaks on 
the theory that anyone caa stay in buUIIeas in aood tiu.-•that only the 
atrcn:aa riaks with eapuiencecl ~~&U~•esu:a aurvive the oth•r extreme. 
The aki manufacturer ia affected more by the extreme• of the 
buataeaa cycle than the aeat wholesaler. becau.ae skis are a lWNry it• 
aucl ..at ia a aeceasity. The luuaer ia in a bad position here, because 
the ski aaaufacturer likely will 1110t aell his entire atock. Thus there 
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will be no funds, or maybe only 1uufficient funds, to repay the loan. 
However, the baak is someWhat locked into the agreement, because the 
teraa state that the loan does not have to be repaid for one year. The 
meat whole,.ler may diacontinue credit in a matter of one week if he ao 
desires. The demand for meat will not drop aa sharplJ durina bad times 
as the demand for akia, ao there ia leas need for curtailin& credit by 
the meat wholesaler. The merchant, thea., will have more control over the 
credit be extends relative to the buaineas trend than does the bank. 
Antecedent informatioa necessary for a decision on whether a 
debto~ will pay includea, aecordta& ~ Foulke'• definition, a " •••• full 
record of the individuals aaaociated toaether in operating a buainess en• 
terpri.ae, aDC1 the record of the bualaess eaterprise, itself, since incep-
tion ... 12 The record of the incU.vicluala includes such infonaation as time 
and place of 'birth, education, wo'l'k experience, and responsibilities with• 
in the enterprise. Alto incluclecl are record items such as law suits and 
8111 associations with other enterprises. The record of the enterprise 
itself, includes a complete record of the arowth of the orsantsation from 
birth, iacludin& reorpnizatioas, aeraers. and type of oraaaization (part• 
nershipt corporation, etc.), In the case of the corporation it will in• 
elude all parent•subsidiary and affiliate relationships. Litiaation and 
other record items are also included UDder all types of oraanization. 
Antecedent inforaatioa, which 1a qualitative in nature, canuot 
be subjected to analysie in the maaner of quantitative financial informa• 
tion. If aa inclividual operatiaa a busiaess is a race track habitu~, there 
is no way of aeaaur1na in quantitative teraa the effects on the 'business 
of the operator• a time spent at the track. If the past record of the en• 
terpriae discloses a fraud. there ia no way to evaluate the effects of the 
&aud on the 'busilless today. 
Dun & Bradstreet analysts aad bank analysts do not aaree on how 
11rou1ke and Prochnow, .!2• ..!!£., p. 168. 
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the antecedent factors should be weiahted in the final decision. In the 
followina paragraphs, reactions of the analysts to different factors, 
first personal, and then of the eate~prisa itself, will be noted. 
Behavior Pat:ternaz 
The analyats were &eked to comment on the effect of four per• 
soaal behavior patterns on the c~_.it decision. The patterns arez a race 
track habitue, over•:J.ndulaence in ~coholic. beverqes, acquaintances of 
questionable character, and aae. The Dun & Bradstreet analysts were aakea 
t:o specify which behavior patterns wo•ld definitely indicate a blank rattna. 
A blauk rat ina may sipify e:f. ther or both of two situations. In the first, 
infol'll&tion cou.sidered vital is lackiq. lor example, an up•to-date fi• 
nancial atateaent may not be available. In the aecou.d situation, the in-
fonaat:ton may be complete, but at least one factor of information indicates 
a questionable risk. A blank retia& aenerally aay be interpreted as a si&• 
na1 to the subscriber to avail hiaaelf of a complete report. It is the 
seccmcl cateaory of blank ratinae which will be dealt with in this chapter. 
The bank analysts were &eked te indicate which of the behavior 
patterns would remove a prospective borrower from further consideration. 
The bank analysts aenerally feel that character means proportionately leas 
to the over-all analysis as the enterprise increaaes in size. This is be-
cause the laraer companies have more rules and more diversification of 
operations. Consequently, more llelllbera of the manaaement team look over 
each decision, and there is less chaace of a poor decision be:J.na carried 
to CCJ11Plet1on. 
The race track babitu~ ia definitely a candidate for a blank 
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ratf.aa in the eyea of the three DU1l & Bradatreet analyate. The bank aul• 
yata feel that knowlettae about a ..-.r of the manaaement te&lll is a aood 
warntaa sipal. and further inveatiption ie wanantecl. The reaacm for 
the contraat in opinion 11 prolNably due to the profit motive. The Dun &: 
Bradatreet analyst does not teed to 14in or lose aay bueinese for hie c~ 
pay by hie decisions. aud he rill naturally try to came to a conservative 
decision. The lumk analyst. on the other hand, looks at each case with 
the profit motive 1n mind. He may tea4 to be aliahtly lese coneetvative 
in hia decia:f.on. althoup he will act favorably in a maratnal aituatton, 
havtna full kuowleaae that it is a ll&l"lf.nal aituation. 
OVer- indulaence in alcehoU.c beveraaea would mean a blank ratiq 
automatically to two of the du-ee aaencJ analyata. The bank analyata, 
while coasidut.aa such knowled.&e u a wamtna sianal, would not definitely 
rule out a loan because of this behavior pattern for the saae reason that 
they would not rule out the race track habitue. The third aaency anal yet 
aacJ most of the bak analysts broupt out: the point. that there is an area 
of judaement aa to when a peraon is ove-indulatna. Drinking may be 
caused by problema in the home, and it ia possible that the buaineaa ia 
not at all affectecl. Oil the other hand, one analyst expreaaed the opinion 
that either samblina or drinkin& behavior patterna are bad beeauae a pre-
ferred riak would have no time for either the track or excessive uae of 
liquor. 
The rtek • a haviq acquaintances of queetionable character is 
the third factor to be diecuased. Two of the three agency analyata feel 
that this may constitute sufficient reason to use the blank rattna. The 
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thircl aaency anal yet feel a that it il un.juat to jw.tae a man • s character 
completely by his acquaintaacea. Such a juda•ent situation merit• a 
conatat vi&il by that analyat. Tbe baaltere were once aaain aoverned by 
the profit motive to some extent. Two bank analyets recited the folloviq 
eaaaple. The vencliu& aachine business hae loq been tainted becauee eome 
of the owaers ancl manaaera have either beeR of questionable character, 
theaaelvea, or have been kaown to bave had buaineaa clealinae with members 
of the unclervorld. The bank analyat• are fully aware of the eituation, 
yet both banke have loana outataadiaa to lll.Oera of that incluatry. The 
profit 1110tive undoubtedly accouata for some of the favorable decisions, 
but probably the fact that the loaa are collateral loans on the equip-
llleBt lesaens the importance of the character factor. 
Ale aa a factor relative to a credit rilk lll8J refer to three 
sepu:ate but related elaents. They area experience in the field, ID&tu• 
rity of judpmeut, and physical eaers:y aad health. The qeacy aac1 baak 
analJata were of one mind relative to the aae factor. Inexperience is 
one of the lea4ina causes of bu.ainqs failure. accordina to Dun & Brad• 
street.13 A business manaaed. by iaexperiencecl pers~s will invariably 
be ratecl blank by the aaency analysts until euch tiae as auccees ie indi• 
cated. The baka will aenerally lend to such a llUID&Jement only on a 
secured or endorsed basis. Maturity is relevant only at the extremes of 
youth ancl olcl qe. A youna, t ... ture manaaeaent will have difficulty se-
curina credit, and a maaaaement past maturity or borderina on senility 
is equally as weak a cre4it rilk. Whea a key fiaure of the muaaeaent 
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te.. ia either sufferina from failina health or ia past hia moat produc• 
tive years, aae may alao be a detriment to the firm's success in obtaining 
fiuncial ald. 
ODe further point ia wo•thy of discussion at this point in the 
thesl.a. All of the urban baDka make use of the character reference ser-
vices to some extent to aid in the evalwation of manaaemeut. The aubur• 
ban baaka tend to rely on the aervices to a lesser dearee, if at all. The 
urban banks must make use of auch services because their borrowers are of 
statewide and even national scope. OD the other band, borrowers uaina the 
suburban banka are mostly local people with whom a closer personal rela-
tionship ie possible. the character aewicea do an adequate job on the 
out•of•town manaaementa when it ia remembered that character ia not ao 
aipificaat to the b&Dkara in evaluatina the rialt factor for the laraer 
buainesaea. The suburban baaka, caterina to the •aller buaineaaes, have 
first hancl information on the charac.c.er of ~t throuah their own 
personal interviews. Dun & Bradstl"eet, which is now au international con-
cern, makes ita own personal investiaations in all cases. 
lecol"d of the Business lnterprise: 
The aecood cateaory of antecedeat information is the record or 
history of the bua1nea8 enterpriae itself. The intonation included in 
such a history should be complete and unbroken since the foundina of the 
buaineaa. The record should include faveJ:'able aa well as undesirable 
eventa. The aaalyata were aaked to co.uat on the effect of aix poaaible 
undesirable occuJ:'rencea in the history of a business. These are: bank• 
ruptcy, fire, fraud, litiption, li111a, the takina of unearned discounts, 
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a.a4 an account beiq turaed over to a professional collector. Once asain1 
the Dun & B~adstreet analysts were &eked to iDdicate which occurrences 
would require a blaak rattna, aDd the bank analysts were asked to iudi• 
cate which occurrences would mean a refusal of credit. 
Baakruptcy is an el..aat which chanaea a ratina to blank auto• 
matieally, accordiq to the Dun & Jra4atnet book of rules. The ratins 
r.atu blank for a period of DOt leas than five years. At the end of 
that period it ia up to the analyst to re-evaluate the case, takina into 
conaidel'atioa the l'eeord compiled by the company durin& the probattonuy 
period. one analyst iDdicatea that a fol'mer bankrupt would rarely aet a 
ratina any hiJher thu secoacl liae credit (aood) • The buk analyats feel 
that a bankruptcy is detrimeatal to the credit standing of an enterprise, 
but the tiae ctf tbe bankruptcy ae well u the eODtrf.butina conditione are 
takea into conaiderattou. The etate of the econoary atabilitywiae and 
relative to the buaineaa cycle at the time of the baakruptcy is moat t.-
portat. Generally, the baDir.a act favotrably toward a bankrupt aeek.ina 
credit unleaa the inaolveacy is relatively recent aad inaufficient col'• 
reetive action baa beea takea. laakruptcy which occurred directly eub• 
aequeat to the atoek market crash aa4 throuah the depresaion years ie not 
coaaidered hilbly detr~tal ualeaa the enterprise baa been unable to 
&hake off injurious after-effect&. 
A fire record may be detriaeatal to an enterprise in either of 
two euea. The fir at ia when aeon baa been prcwezu the aecoad ia when 
thue baa beea an exceaaive D.UIIber of unexplained fires. The cavae of 
the fire aa4 aar poaaible aealiaeace are tmportant faetora to be considered 
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in any action by either the aaency o~ bank aaalyata. MOat reputable buai• 
aeaaea are fully covered by fire taavrance. Dun & Bradstreet analysts 
diacre41t 'buataeaaea which are not propuly insured, and the 'banka expect 
an uninaured buaineaa to purchase a prop.r amount of insurance before 
makiq loaaa. 
Fraud will definitely brina a blank rating from any of the three 
agency analyata. Such a record would alao ~le out the posaibility of 
bank loans. It is difficult for a buaineaa to remove the atisma of a 
fraud even when thoae conaected with it have been removed from office. 
Generally. Dun & Bradstreet aDalyltl will leave a blank ratta& on a bust• 
ness cormected with a fraud for a long probationary period. The banka 
will eateod tredit only in unusual situations. 
Litiaation aay affect the ability of an enterpriae to command 
credit • depending on the nature of the liti&&tion and the amount of money 
which ia iavolved. tax evaaion is a felony • and would receive no better 
thea the blank ratina from the DuD & Bradstreet analyst&. While a busi• 
neaa may set aside funds in anticipation of an adverae court deciaion, an 
exceasive amount of litiaatio couW conceivably put the banker in the un• 
desirable position of havina more funds in a business than the owners. 
A tax lien is a leaal tool used by the aovermaent to hold prop-
el'ty Ol' to have it sold or applied fOI' payraeut of a tu claim. It is 
&eaerally WJed when the SOVer~U~~eRt beU.evea that there is no other possible 
way to settle a bill for back taxes. If the lien ia used because there 
is aoaae, disqreeaeat about accouattaa aethode, for eumple, the analyata 
do not become alarmed unless the coatill&eat payment is so larae that there 
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ia a poa8ib11ity of the bv81ae88 beiDa forced into receivership. 00 the 
other han4, if the tax ·lien is vsecl because of failure to pay social 
security taxes withhe14 from employee&, the analysta will rule aaatn•t 
the buatnus. failure to pay aoclal aecurity taxes is conai4ere4 by anal• 
ysta as the lowest fom of thievery, reau•lle•s of the dollar amount. 
Trade checks can brtDa out valuable information about a ~u1ineaa 
look iDa for creclit. Adverae conclition1 uy be recoanlse4 as takina three 
fon:as. These are: the takin& of unearaecl discounts, laxity or ne.aliaence 
in meetiq trade obU.pticma, 8114 the final step of havin& an account 
turned over to a collectioo qeacy. The takina of unearned discounts baa 
become a commoa practice in aome tnAuttries aa well as by in4ivi4ual firma 
ill the United ltatu. CreditoYs who offer caah diaeounta of 21. 10, net 
30 claya. fO.- __,1., have foacl that UllJ debtora tske diaeounts beyond 
the ten clays allowed, anc1 in 8011le easel up to the 30 day net tena. This 
baa created a problem for credit maaaaera, because competitors may be al• 
lowtaa the extended term~. lf the debtor ia not handled with the utmoat 
taet, his business Ill&)' be lost to e011petition. Some creditors who are ex• 
pandina have been williq to eue up on the credit terms in order to aid 
the expanaioa of aalea ,aw:t profita. 'llle debtor's practice of takina ad• 
vaataae of this easina up on terms 4oes not earn a blank ratin& from the 
aaeacy analyata, but aeither does it receive a top eredit ratina. Slow-
aua in meetlaa obliptions will remeve a top credit rat in& automatically. 
As a firm becomea prop:e1sively alower in meet ina obliptiona, the ratina 
will 'be dropped to lower claaaifi.cationa. In the caae of extreme laxity, 
or the point at which the profesaional collection aaencies are called in, 
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the ratiq will be blank. Usually, however, the financial cOildition baa 
deteriorated faster than trade payments, so that the blaak ratiaa would 
precede the collection aaeacy criteria for a blank ratina. 
In contrast, it should be kept in mind that funds borrowed from 
the oak enable the buaineaa to aet on a eurreat basis with trade sup-
pliers in tbe event the buaiaeaa is ut already current with ita auppU.ers. 
Baaka vUl leacl funds to buaineoes in lUCk couitiou when. it ta felt that 
the loan will help the coapany out of trouble. It ia hoped that such aaaia-
taace will be only temporary, aa the banks 4o not want to be put in the 
position of havin.a loans appear to 'be inveatec:l capital. 
Arltececlent iafon~ation wbich may adversely affect a credit de-
ciaiM has beeu noted. The final 4eeiaion, however t must rest on 1110re 
thaD the record it:au alone. CepacU:y and the financial analysis are im-
port:ant considerations to be taken up in the next two chapters on Dun & 
Bradstreet and the baaka. 
Dun & Bl'aclatreet :f.a a aercantile credit aaency which evaluates 
the ability of a business fil'm to ~Met fiaaaelal obU.ptiooa. the evalu• 
atioa i1 made in term. of the firm•• past payment record and present capa• 
city to pq. 
the ratiqs ue macle up of two •JIIbols. a letter: anc1 a numbel'. 
'lhe letter: f.D41cates the dollu amount of tan&ible net worth. Taualble 
net worth is defined as total assets leas intanaible assets and liabili• 
ties. the number element repl'eleats an appraisal of the company's credit 
streqt;.h, wh:&.ch is a coaaposite of the fina' a past payment record an4 pre-
se& capacity to pay. The numbu1 iadtcate, as noted previously, excell• 
ent, poet, fair, and limited. TbUI, a ratina of D2 would iadicat.e a tan-
&ible net worth which lies w:l.thin lhe raqe of $35 ,000 to $50,000, and a 
composite credit appraisal of "pM" • 
two other retinas are poaai'ble. The "tnveatip.tf.rl&'' rat ina in-
dicates that tweatiption was iacOIIPlete when the book in which the ratiq 
appears weat to pres1. The abaeace of a rattaa, expressed by the blank 
( • ), aiJPifiea that circumataocea were difficult to claaaify within the 
~enaed ratina 1,mbola. Such a l'attna should suaaeat to the subacriber 
the advisability of obtaintn& a full copy of the report for additional in• 
fo~~aation. 
l.eporta: 
The qency sells reporta which can be divided into two clasae8 
for purposes of description. the &DalJtical report covers all busiaeaa 
of tmpble net worth in exceaa of $125.000, as well aa carriere subject 
to Interstate Coaaerce Colaiaalon J•d.uiction. In rare cases, bueineaaee 
with taqiJJle net worth of leas thaa $W ,000 are reported in the anal)'U.• 
cal report fon. these buainesaea ue subjects of an Ul\uaually hiah in-
quir)' rate 'by subscribers to the DUD. & lradstreet service. All other en• 
terpriau, from the one-aaan ahoe repair 1hop to coll'POratious with tangible 
net worth up to $12.5 , 000 are reported u Collllaercial lleports • 
the Senice; 
nun & lraclatreet sella auvlce contracts of various suea de-
peodiq oa the aeoaraphical arM ccwued. there are contracts coved.na 
areaa aa eaall' as Iuten. MuaachU1ett1 • and as larp aa the entire United 
Stdea. la a4dit1on, repol'ta are •ailable uout buaiaessea in ~her na-
U.oo.l. The subscriber receives a book oa a lease basis which U.ata all 
busiaeaaes in the area covered bJ his conk act. Beside each business 
name appears a cleaipation of tla tJPe of business operated and a credit 
ratina. The book ia revised b)' Dun • Bra4atreet four times each year. 
lt is poaaible, then. for a su'bKrlber to aet ae maD.)' as three revisions 
of the book clui.na the tena of hia asmual contract. 
'!'be purchaser of a coutrut ia alao entitled to copies of the 
actual reports. lach contract is 1U.ited in the number of report a which 
can be obtained without extra cbarp. Generall;y, the laraer the area 
covered 'by the contract, the hipu the number of reports allowa'ble with-
out the aurcbup. 
Duu & Bradstreet also offers a D.UIIIber of other aervicea • on 
separate ~racts. They will only be aentioD.ed here • as a discussion 
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of the services ia not pertiaent to the present thesis. There is a Mer-
cantile Cla111ls Divisiou, which is a ullection service. There .ue a 
areat lla'AJ pubU.cationa auch as, 111hm1 a B.evlew arul Modem I'Aduatry," a 
IIOQthly publication. Other pub114atioa.a are distributed at lneaulu 
intervals. 
Ellpbaala on Factors of lvaluacion: 
After interviewirl& three aaalyats at Dun & Bratl.atreet, an at• 
tempt baa been made to potat out the elemeata uaed in appraiatna a credit 
risk, and to rank the elemeuta in o~der of importance. It ia sufficient 
to state hewe that the v.uiatiou in analyaia do not lie in the tools uaed 
aa much as 1a the emphasis 011 the dif,..ent fact;ora taken into c0118idel'a-
tion. Ar&alyata, beiq lnd.ividuala, are not in agre-.ent aa to the rela• 
tive weipta which abould be placed ou tbe different elemeuta of t:he 
creclit risk. 
The aalysta were aakecl to rak the five el~ta J character, 
capacity • tra&le experience, accouat balances, and borrowtna experience. 
They were unanimous in rankia& character at the top of the list as the 
moat illportaot factor. In a credit sale. tbe seller eachaaps hia JOOd,a 
for the customer's pt:omiae to pay at a ft.alure elate. "That prcaise ia 
~th little if a customer doe8 not intend to keep it, or if he is a ~al 
veaklina vho will fail a promise that has become irksome to perform, or 
if he has vices that m.ay bu hia from fulfillin& his proeiae."14 A cur 
t:omer 1UJ have the capacity or cash to diachuae the obU.ption, but he 
114)' aot pq if he does not feel the moral obU.aation to pay. ODe analyst 
14DuP •' lft&a ,pel Me4tg Jeehaatu • April. 1956, p. 29. 
- 30. 
4U a~ate, however, that othc factora could precede character, depeudin& 
upon the circuautancea. Ch&l'acter tenet a to lo1e its importance as the 
aiae of the business inereues due to departmentalizaU.on an4 the apread 
of reapouibility. 
Capacity, or the abUity to retire obliptions as they mature, 
is the aecond taOst important el•ent. U it is a1certained that a cue• 
toaer is will ina to pay provided he has the funds, then the natural quea-
tiou to Uk is, nnoes he have the fuudat'' Capacity, aa will be explained 
lhortly, ia measured by the cooditlons ahown on the various fiaancial 
statement&. Specifically, the iDcema stat .. ent shows the flow of funds 
over a period of time, aud the balance sheet showa the amou.ut of funds em 
haod at a epeciflc moment in time. 
The el-.ats beyond c:hal-ecter m4l capacity are not really tepa-
rate elements, because they are f.D. support of capacity. Of theee elements 
~rade expuience ie consiclued the aost important by the analysts, be• 
cause the hlacorical record of p~ta reflects the manner in which trade 
obliptions have bean hanclled in the past. .Ad:adttedly, evidence of a sood 
payment record in the past is DOt a auaraatee of future payment. but it 
1a an important factor in aradiD& a c:ua1toaer as a credit risk, because it 
does abow a tread. 
The other elementa of the credit riak, account balances and bor• 
rowina expel'ience, need explanation. "Account balanceat' refers to the 
averqe amount of caah kept in the blllk by the cuat01aer. Weakneas in a 
cust...r•a ftDancial condition may be brouaht to lisbt by the banker's 
commen-.. If the balance sheet, for exa.ple, indicated $10,000 of ca1h 
in the baak • and the bank indicated averaae balancea in the low four 
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ftaurea, then there would be a queaktOD u to where at least $7,000 1a. 
808e buaiaea'aea build up the caah aceowt prior to statement time to im-
prove the statement for creclit plU'poaea. there 1a also a poasibility that 
c:.he financial atatement is fraudulent. Baakers will indicate :tf the ac• 
count hal been over-drawu at ear recent time, and this is another daaaer 
sipal. 
Borrowtna experience refU'a c. tlua paat record of a cu1tomer 
with ita bank relative to loana. The informatioa to be &athered ia the 
recent blah credit, which 11 an in41c.ation of the confidence of the bank 
in the accOUDt. The type of loan, eithu secured or unsecured. ta also 
indieative of the bank' • coafideace. An unaecurecl loan ind:l.eatea a 
atnaaer fluancial position than a aeeurecl note. The banker will indicate 
ia .--al tcmu the amount of any loan• pre1ently outstand:tna. He will 
also verify the amount of the loan aa of the statement d.ate. this infor-
mation will verify a part of the liability aide of the finaacial state-
Uilt. .All of this information will be .-eel up by the baraker in his 
atat..at about relations between the euatoaer and. the lJak. "8atisfac• 
tel'f relations" means that all •tea have been handled as qa:eecl, and that 
the account 4oea not over-draw. If the baaker does not indicate satitfac• 
tiou, then f\Jnber investipt.ion is in o1:cler. 
The ~financial aspects of the crecllt taveati&ation were dis• 
cuaaecl in chapter Ill. The remaltlcler of this chaptu will be clevoted to 
a clleevaaion of fiDancial. a1pect1 ef the inveati&atioa aa u1ed by Dun & 
Bradstreet. 
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liQAQCial Aapectaa 
Dun & Bradatreet uaea the trend aaalyaia tool in atudytna fiuan• 
c:l.al atat--ta. The trencl reflecta the compoa:Lte cluection of the buai• 
neaa over a ped.ocl of at least three yeara. Each analytical report in• 
cluclea fiacal atatamenta for tba three latest per:l.ocla available. The 
qea.cy files all atatementa of previoua reara ao that they may be used 
for refereace throulbout a liveD buaia .. a cycle, and also to note any 
a:l.pificant chauaea oc.curd.q in recent yeua beyond the three printed in 
the publiahed report a. 
!be apncy uaea internal analyaia aa defined previoualy. Caah 
balaucea are verified, and aD¥ baak obliaationa are checked to brina atate• 
raent inlcmaation up to date. !ra4e references are checked at six-month 
intervala. aDd aome ratio analyaia ia uaed aa described later in t~ia 
chapter. Accor4:Lna to one analyst • credit reports are conaideruly 
weakened clue to the lack of auparviaed inventory-takin& aru.t accounts re-
ceivable vuifieation. Theae are illport&llt elements of internal analyaia 
which are not included in the Dun & Bradatreet analyaia. The reaaon for 
the laok of theae el•enta ia the prohildtive coat of such an examination. 
Moat companies DOW repcn:t tha inventoty valuation is baaed on 
coat or market • whichever ia lower. Coat valuation :La aeuerally lower in 
en expandinl economy. The metho4 of coat evaluation, then, :La an illlportant 
conalcleratlcm. Generally, one of two uthocla :La uaed, lU'O or LU'O. When 
the rtro (firat•in, firat•out) ~~Mtlhod ia uaecl, it :La aaaum.ed that the pods 
ue aold in the or4er in which they were received. When the Lli'O (laat•in, 
fil'at•out.) metbo4 :La used, the aaaUII.ption :La that the aoocla received. laat 
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vere aold fir at. LIFO corresponclta with the actual facta in vel'Y few caaee. 
"LUO will tend to level out the reported profits over a cycle of risin& 
and .fallina prices. The reported profits lD perioda of rislns prices will 
be leas than under rtro, and in periods of decrnsing prices will be 
hiper ... lS Accord ina to Husband a Dockeray ,16 "(FU'O) •••• is the method 
moet commonly in use because it moat nearly conforms with the actual flow 
of lOMe," The LIPO method of evaluation will reflect a IIIIUlller fipre 
for iuventory than will PIPO, especially durina periods of inflation. 
Another problem area relative to iuventory valuation f.a that of 
obsolescence. Benj.S.O. recopiaea this factor when diseueeiD& hie True 
Cunent B.atio, meuttoned earlier in thia theste. 17 The problem of obao-
le~eence is particularly prevalent in tnduatrtes, such ae electronics and 
miasilea, wbere product developmeat ta accelerated by larae and expensive 
research and developaaent ataffe. Here, aaatn. credit aaalysta are shack• 
led by the prohil:titive coat of a phytioal tnventol'J. Even if such a phy-
sical inventory were postil:tle, it ia doUtful if the prol:tlem of obsolete 
iuventory would be solved. The hi&h rate of product development in our 
economy could soon rader &nJ physical Haervation of invatory obsolete. 
There appears to be no direct solution to this problem, but an awareneat 
by the credit analyst of its &liat:ence ts certainly a positive step in the 
ript direction. 
15:oonald H. Mackinata, D• l'!m4aaentalt of Ae¢0U!tl9& (Jleviaed 
EditionJ law York: The Maoaillaa Colapauy. 1956), p. 329. 
16w1111aaa H. Husbaa.d aM Jaea c. Dockeray, Modern Corporatigp 
FiDece (4th Edition; Bomewcto4, l111Doiat licbard D. Irwin IDe., 1957), 
p. 520 
17 p. 8. 
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The aaalysta were ukecl to comment on the nature of any compari• 
son made beCWeea the company in question aod the industry and/or ecoaomy. 
Comparison with the industry is done by the analyats uaiug baekaround in• 
formation aatherecl from a v•rieC.J of tourees. .tuacma these 110st often used 
are trade j.uruals, publicatioua of Dun & Bradstreet, and especially in• 
fonaation obtained from interviews with representative companies of e4ch 
1adutry covered. One analyst, whose tenitory includes the area around 
Brockton, Massachuaetts, where there is a coucentration of shoe factories, 
wites reports on the shoe incluatry. Another analyst, who works in the 
north shore area of Massachusetts • is well versed in the leather industry 
because of the numerous tanneries ia that area. Comparison of a business 
with the trand Of the &eoeral 8CODOmJ il used verr little. Correlation 
between paa-al ec0D011ic indicators and coarpay performance is hard to 
trace in any specific instance. Such c-saariaona miaht help to ahow why 
a buainess is or ia not retirtna tr.U obli&ations, but the analyst ia 
more iaterested in whether a business can and will meet the obliptions 
than the reaaoas why. 
Ratio analysis& 
latio analysis is a tool used by all analysts as an aid to eval\&4' 
atin& the trend of a buaiaesa. A ratio shows the relationship between two 
upitucles. B.atioa are particularly useful when studied over a period of 
three or more years and are useful in showiq rates of change. · The only 
ratio actually computed for publication in the Dun & Bradstreet reports 
ia the cunent ratio. When the Analytical R.eport was ori&J.nally desipecl 
by Dun & Bradstreet Vice-preaident Roy loulke, a total of fourteen basic 
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Tat:l.oa were computed. Tc:Hiay, only the cur'l:'ent ratio remains in the aaal7"' 
tical repo'l:'ts. The ratios aa ortainally set up by Foulke weTe to be used 
in conjunction with the fourteen t.,owtant Tatios18 which are publiahed 
as standard ratioa of comparison by tb.e aaency. These ratios are still 
published aanually • but are not in uae by the analysts. 
It ta not clear why the use of the ratios was diacont:.lo.ued, but 
three reaaous have been set forth. Pirlt, the analysts feel that the ttme 
needed to compute the ratios is DOt jut.ified• because the ratios are con-
8idered only a einor part of the entire credit report. Second, the anal• 
yatl feel that maoy businea..-n do not understand the aignifieaace of the 
ratios. Third, businea81Hn do DOt want to take the time to analyze the 
ra,ioa, preferrina that the aaalyat abould emphasize the significant points 
brouabt to li&bt by the ratios. To aatiafy this need, the Analytical te-
port haa a t'Finaocial Analyait' section which does outline the important 
pointe. 
The analysts actually compute the ratioa on rare occasions only, 
but IIW1Y of the ratios are CC1111pUted aeat.ally durin& the process of analy-
at a. After the current ratios, the anal71ta consider debt to net worth 
aa the moat ilaportant ratio. Illveat017 and receivable tum-overs as well 
as the "acid teat" ratio are also used. One analyat noted th.at the inven• 
tory turn-over ratio is week for camparleoa with other companiea, because 
there is no standard method of iuventory valuation, as noted previously. 
However, the tum•over is aood for determlnina trends within a single coa-
pany. 
lSaoy A. Foulke, C!f1t$ Trencla ia Te!J!! of Sale (lfew York: Dun 
& Bradstreet, IDe., 1957), p. 48. 
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lt.aDclard Bat1oa: 
DuD & Bradstreet publiahea annually a booklet of fourteen at~ 
dan ratios for JBa~W.facturers • wholeaalcs • and retailers by 1neuatry. 
There are a sreat 118DJ rat1oa in use, but moat of the analysts appear to 
use cml.y a chosen few. It ia iatereatiq to note that a corapauy Which 
waa p~ably the pioneer in the oomputation and uae of standard ratios 
appears to make very little uae of th• today. Two of the Dun & Jb'adstreet 
analysta indicate that the staodard ratios are of ab,.lutely ao value aa 
credit tools • and they submit three ~reuoas for their stand. The fir at 
is that by the Uae the standa~rd rat:iea are computed and published, they 
are of Uttle value to the analyst. The reports are revisecl twice yearly, 
ao year•eucl fi&ul'es, for 1959, fo't example, would be needed prior to June, 
1960. Dun & Bradstreet published the 1957 composite fiaurea in a booklet 
titled "Current Trends in Teru of Sale" Sa the aprina of 1959, or about 
one year beyond the time they would b.ave been useful to the analyst. A 
aecoocl weakness in the ratios is tlle fact that fiacal years of the various 
corapaaiea under consideration vary, aa4 there ia no known way to veipt 
the ratios for this iaconsistency. A third weakness i8 the fact that no 
two bua1neasea operate in exactly the same maaner. For example, a company 
uy be claaaified aa a paper ma.nufacturer. However, the a8111e company may 
al1o have ita own wholesale diviliou, ol' a printiua division. Actually, 
the buaineaa may be claasified accorcU.oa to any of the three operations, 
and thua there are three seta of different at&Ddard ratios with which to 
coaapue. The analyst is faced with the problem of jud&iDI which of the 
three aeta of ratiol ia the moat uteful. 
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The Workiq capital lleMD.ta 
The analysts were ulr.ed to coaaeut on woniaa capital, specifi· 
cally with refereace to bow larae a decrease is considered a aianificant 
one. ODe analyst iaclicat.es that a aeaual rule aiabt be auy decrease in 
excess of 10 per cent. The other two feel that no definite fiaure cau be 
set, aa the siaaificance varies with the size of the business, the size 
of the decrease in relation to any chaaae in the industry, and the nature 
of the decrease, i. e. , where did tbe moaey ao. Companies plaaniq an ex-
pansion of fixed assets often build up large aaounta of net workina capi• 
tal in order to fitumce the expauiou from within. When the flmds are in-
vested ln the new asset a, a larse decreue in net working capital occurs 
which is offset by an increase in the aount of fixed assets. This is an 
expected decrease which needs no explanation on the part of manaaement. 
However, if the decrease in workin& capital is due to a dividend in ex-
cess of eara.inp, or worse, to a aet loss for tbe period, an explanation 
should be fortbcomina. 
R.attnas: 
The final question asked of the analysts is one which involves 
a areat deal of Juctaement on the part ol each analyst. Dun & Bradstreet 
uses five credit ratinaa 1 aDd the analysts were asked to differentiate 
between th• in aeaeral terms. 
Generally, there are three requirements for a business to have 
any l'atiaa. Pil'st, the record of mttece4ent information llU8t be COIIlPlete. 
Second. stateaents BlUSt be received at reaular intervals. Accord ina to 
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qeocy I'Ulea, the moat receat. atateaeat ••t be leas than fifteen mouths 
old • or the rat ina auat be 1144e bleak. A statement which i.e approachiq 
the fifteen raontha liait may aul»ject the company to a lower ratia& be-
cauae of uncertainty of the preaeat fiuaacial condition. Third, trade 
oblipU.ona must be retired in a aatiafactoi'J ma:nner, which aeaus t.hat 
there can be very little indication of alowneas. Analysts vary somewhat 
in their application of the rulea ao4 in their opinioua of the break•dOWD 
amana the various rattnaa, therefore, the followtaa paraarapha will at• 
tempt to reflect their aeaeral feeliUII• with pertinent exceptions noted. 
To receive an "excellent," ol' first line, ratiq, the analyata 
feel that a coapany IIIU8t present an all•around favorable picture. The an-
tecedent information muat present ca unblemiehed record which ia complete 
in all 4eta11a. FiJ:uaDcial etat--.ta a.Jtt be aubmitted at replar inter• 
vals, which means that a December 31 statement muat be received before 
June of the aubaequeat year. The finaacial condition 11U8t present a 
favorable one, with operatioas returnina a aood profit. A top-rated buai• 
ness will aot ori1aar1ly borrow at the bank, and any loans muat be paid 
out IIIUlUally. Trade payaeo.ta muat be retired within terms with discounts 
taken Where offered. Any evicleace of alow or lax paymenta aut.Oill&tically 
removes a riak from the top credit cateaory, but occasional lossea of dis• 
counts are tolerated. 
A "aooct," or sec.U line, ratiq has a somewhat lower standard 
tba the top rattna. The record it_. muat once qaia be complete and 
favoral»le. Occaaionally, a fomer 'baakrupt may enter as hiah as this 
claaaiflcatiou; only in rare iuat.-cea could a bankrupt exceed this position. 
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The fiaaacial information auat be received at reasonably replar inter• 
vale, but in no inatance could the information be withheld. The finan• 
cial condition aay be somewhat leas favorable than for the top line, but 
in no illata.ce will there by &D.'I unfavorable conditions. A loss aiabt be 
tolezoated, if it did uot Jaate#ially affect the finaocial cODdition, and 
if the tncluatry u a whole did poorly ewer the financial period. Gauer• 
ally • thie ia the hipeat ratiq obcataed by 'buail'lesaea havina net wo~th 
of leas than $12.5,000. There can 'be *' indication of laxity in meetina 
tl'acle oltli&atiaaa of any conaequence, dc:ept whel'e a pod, verified ex-
planation is available. Payaenta MJ or aq not 'be ll&de in a diacount 
1118Dl\er. The risk uy bonow at the bank, but auat repay this de1Jt aea• 
aonally, or at least on an annual baaia. 
The cat in& for thircl liae credit, "fair," is &OIIlewhat of a 
catchall. Two of the analysts do DOt uM the "Uaited" cateao;y.t thus a 
buaineaa will be either "fair," or "blak." the statements may be aub-
lllitted on aa ineplar baaia, and aenerally they will reflect an extended 
condition for the line of buaine.aa. lllt.el:'pd.aea in this eateaory aener-
ally borrow at the bank the year arouad, and aay not be a'ble to pay out 
debt aanually as do businesses in moce favorable cateaories. Slowness in 
meetin& true oltU.ptf.ODa is the rule rather than the exception, but in 
no case would the accouat be placed for collection. 
the "limltecl" cateaory is used by oaly one of the aaalyata, and 
eva then :l.n rare :l.natancea. Thia 1a not an qency policy, but baa c01De 
to be aa unwritten rule amona the aaalysta. The fiaancial condition of 
the few bua1D.easea :l.n this cateaory 11 beat described as iaciiffereat, but 
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operations are aeaerally profitable. Payments are painfully slow, often 
as lema aa one year. However, p~ is always received, with no sur 
plier ever raportin& a loss from the aecount. The break•off point between 
this cateaory and ••bl.-" (or the "fatE" cateaory for cues rated by the 
other analysts) is the belief tbat the business will be able to continue 
for anothu year withcNt the creclitors atuting baukruptcy proceedinas. 
If the buaineaa which falls in t.bia catepry is aec01111110dated at all at the 
bak, it wlll be on a secured buis. 
The blauk (•) cateaoi'J 11 reMI'Ved for three situationa. The 
first is the cue noted above where the analyst fails to find reason for 
the buainess to continue for ._Cher yeu. A aecou.d is the situatioa 
wherein tbue ia some weakneaa or antececleat diaCX"epancy, which the anal• 
yac feels ahould be brought to the attention of the subscriber. This cate• 
aory la alao uae4 as a claaaiflc:ation for altuatlona wherein neceaa.uy in• 
formation 18 lackiq. The blliDk 1'&tina 18 a sip.al to the subacr:l.ber to 
read the full report before proceedina furaher with any buaineaa holdtng 
such a rati.q. 
It ia of interest that the Dun & Bradstreet key to rattn&s notes 
that, "The absence of a ratiq, expttesaec1 by the clash (•), ia &lOt to be 
construed aa unfavorable but aianifies circumatancea difficult to classify 
within condensed ratina symbols and should 8UI8est to the subscriber the 
adviauUity of obtaintna additioul infonaation." Certainly the analysts' 
claaaificationa are not completely in asreeaant with the aaency'a stated 
policy. 
eom.ercial banks, under coaaideration in the present chapter, 
are financial iutitu.tioua which receive IIOiley on depoaf.t au.bject to with• 
drawal u.poa. d~. Ia fuada are alao obtd.ned throuah capital atock 
and retd.a.ed earaiqa, but depoalt.a paerally exceed by more than ten 
times the ia.veatecl capital of the bak.19 
The nature of the fuacla with which the bauk operates limits the 
uses of those funds. The aaaeta of the baak must be sufficiently liquid 
to enable it to meet liabilities aa4 witbdrawala under all forsee&ble con• 
diticme. The asaet1 are uaed for both f.ave.ataellt arul loan purpoaea. IJ:t. 
veacmenta coaaiat of United States and local aoverament oblf.&atiolla as 
well U 80188 hip &racle COrt>O"&te bonU • J.oana Ue &enera.lly short• term 
in nature. Conauaa' sales paper, such u aut0110bile loans, and a small 
number of loaa. with lonaer maturity, such aa term and real estate loans, 
are baa41ec1 by the couaercial baka. 20 The ahort•tena buaineas loan of 
leas than one year's duratioR will be the ealy bank asaet diacua•ecJ in 
the theaia. 
The present chapter will cU~u.ss first the factors which are 
taken into couideratioa whea ft'aluatiq a credit risk. The discussiOA 
will then focus on aaae of the toola used 1a the evaluation. Finally, 
the use of the tools 1n attiviua at the credit decision will be conaidered. 
1
'waltel" s. Seidman, A&CI!!ISIJ!i!ivyle and 1Bvstett Fi.p!as1y 
(ADa Anor, Mlohipn.: Maatcco Pr•••• 1957), p. 2. 
20aetdmaa, .D· cit., p. 3. 
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Weiabe.:tq of lvaluattua r~tora s 
lt ia apparent that the toola uaed tn credit aaalyais are essen-
tially the ... for all aaalyata. but the wai&bts aiveu to the differeat 
factors which aake up a deeiaioa vuy couiclerably .-.,q aaal1ata. There 
is variation tn weiabtina not ouly betweca mercantile and beak aaalyate, 
but alao between the tadiviclual analysts in each field. 
The b&Dk analysts were aivD a list of six factors to rank in 
order of importaace to the credit decisloa. Many of them hesitated about 
autld.la& aeneral stat-..uts • ao e;a11 aeat.s restd.ctf.na the anawera are also 
included in the paraaraphs wbl.ch follow. The factors uncler couideration 
are1 dluacter, capacity, bonowiq eapaience, account balaa.cea, trade 
refereaeea, aad &&eDCY repotta. 
Character of JUDaaemeat is raalled as the first and 110at impor-
tant element of analysis, but the analyse. r&Dk it first with reeervation. 
'lbe sue of #he entel'pri.ae ia the dectcl11a& factor. In suller businesses 
where one o1r a vuy few people are reapoD~J.'ble for business policy • charac• 
ter ia of utmost importaa.ee. Ia pueral, the laraer the business becomes. 
the leas power is exerciaec:l by aay oae individual. B.eapOAaibtlity is 
spread thiiU all deciaiou are reviewe4; and aa iadividual merabel' of the 
uaanqet~eDt tea would have clifficultJ f.a perpt$l:atiaa a fraud. Cel'tainly, 
the character of the ....... eut of ron HcJtor COIIlJUU'IJt for example, is 
aolna to have very little effect oa wbethel' ol' oot the coqpaqy maet1 ita 
obU.ptiou &I they mature. 
capacity 11 aenerally the second•r&Dked factor of the credit de-
cision. except where charaetu cease• to be of prime ilaportance. If it 
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ie aacerta1ne4 that JUU.&emeut will retire obli&atione provided funde ue 
available, certaiuly the next cooaideration ahould be to ascertain if the 
funds at:e available. 
Character 811d capacit)' are by far the two moat important fac:tora 
to be atuclied in arriviq at a credit decision. The other four factors 
ca be cooai.dered sub• facto-rs u ther are aodifiera of either chuacter 
or capacity, or both. 
Borrowtna eaperieoce ia eonsidewed the third most t.portant fac• 
tor by moet of tbe bukers in the etudy. If the account baa borrowed pre-
viouely, the loaaina officer will have acae idea of what to expect in the 
future. This factor modifies both character and capacity as it an8Wera. 
in a historical acmse, the quutiona, "Will he pay'l'' and "Can he pay?" 
If the loans were retired accorcliq to aareement, chances are aoocl for 
continued satisfactory relatione. If payments were received late, then 
the analyst will first find out the reason for late payments. Dela,ed 
paJJ181lt8 without aood reuou would pre1ent aa additional factor to conaid• 
er in exteadina further credit. 
Accouat balancea were ranked founh by the analysts. Balances 
by themselves mean very little, but when compared with statezaeut ftaurea, 
or tnapecced for seaaonal fluctuatioaa, they ma,y be a valuable source of 
infot:'ll&tion. Bankera aeaerally require borrower• to keep deposita in the 
bask of at least 20 per cent of the loa. The 20 per cent requirement may 
fluctuate~ especially if a buaineaa ia hishly aeaaonal and ita demands for 
cash hf.ahly variable. 
Ballka V&l'J in theil: practice of cbeckina trade refel'encea. One 
b&Dk I'UI\s tracle checke only oo rue occuiona. The analyet explained that 
the baak 18 in the subvha, aacl the loan officer• ue in very cloee con• 
tact with cuetoaers. The offieere are able to keep an eye on all bottowina 
accounts and are in a position to be awue of trouble before it starts. 
The baak does make use of aaencJ reports for trade experience as an addi• 
tional check on first hand iaf~tioa. the other baaks contact trade 
referacea to check payment recorfla oa all proapective new accounts. They 
also check in special casee where the account is coneidered either marat• 
nal ae a ri1k or where exietina infoma&tieD is considered unreliable. 
Aaency reports are coaai4ered by analysts as the least tmportant 
of the six factors under conaideration. However • all of the analyst a use 
the reports to some extent. Generally, the suburban banks rely on the a• 
aency report• more than the urban banks. This is probably due to the_ fact 
that smaller banks operate with fewer loan officers and smaller staffs. 
They are also haalpered by time limitation• and the expense of investiaa• 
tion. Therefore, they must l'ely on outside sources of information, auch 
as the qency reports. The urba banks have laraer staff a to do the anal• 
yale, and aleo have luaer dollar profite out of which to meet expeneee. 
The aaency reports are used by the urban banks principally to confirm. in-
fo.raation obtained first hana frODl othu eources of information. 
Toole of Finaacial Aaalyaia: 
All of the bank aaalyata base fiaancial iuveati&ation oa trend 
analJeia in one form or auother. Trw aaalyaia iuvolvea a atu4y of " ••• 
the averaae or composite directioa of ohaoae ta a aeries of data exteadf.na 
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over a perioc! of tim.e."21 A8 appliecl to creclit analyaia, trend involve• 
the atudy of balance aheeta and incoae atatementa over a period of time 
iu order to note proareaaf.ve, ltatf.c, or retroll'eaaive changes, and to 
explain theae chana•• where po1af.ble. The study of the trend is usually 
accomplishecl by uaina ratioa, about which •re will be aaid in later para• 
arapb.a. 
The banks alao rely on iotft'Ul analyab, which baa been defined 
aa a atudy of a 1inale statement by itself without the benefit of compari• 
IOU of other atatemetlta of the s•e firiD, the f.nduatry, or the economy. 
The reason for this analyais f.a to conflm iudf.vidual itema in relation 
to each other in the liaht of the analyat' a knowlecl&e of how the particu-
lar stataent sbould appear. Juat aa the DUD & Bradstreet analyst a be• 
come familiar with certain companiea and certain induatri .. , ao do the 
'bank analyst a. 
Statement l.equtrementa: 
Baakers emphasise that audl'-d statements are preferable, and 
a areat deal of confidence is placed ta the auditor' a certificate accom-
panytoa the atat..ant. Certificatea tha& reflect a complete audit with 
inventory aupervision and account• receivable verification are coaaiclerecl 
preferential for obvious reaaona. A well•kaown accountina firm's audit 
ptUarally meana 110re to the analyat thau that of an uofamiliar certified 
public accountant. 
Thel'e is a aeneral rule maoaa bankers that the statements of t.he 
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three previous year• are a min~ for uae in trend analysis. MOat bank 
anal rats prefer five years. Oae analyat in the atuc:ly indicated that a 
vol!'ld.q capital loan would req11ire two to three back atatemeuta, with 
five yeara• recorda the beat. A term loan would require analysia of at 
leaet ten or twelve yesra' statementa, aad up to twenty years in eome 
caaea. The requiremeu.t ia coiDciclent with the lenath of the buaillesa cy• 
cle for the particular induatry in qu.eation. 
latio Analysis: 
Raeio analyaie ia one aethod of studyina a financial trend. 
The ratios are useful in analyaiq a fiuaeial statement for two reuona. 
Firat, the dollar values are convel'ted into a fora which is convenient 
for purpoau of study. ror example, if a company has $2 ,500 worth of cur• 
rent assets sad $925 worth of curreat liabilities, a current ratio of 2.7: 1 
expresaes the value of current aaaeta over current liabilitiea. Second., 
relationships between stateaent iteaa are converted into common teras ao 
that comparison• with standard ratioa are poeaible. Also, compariaona 
with ratios of other atatementa of the a.me company are easier to make. 
latio analyaia ia uaed to ...e extent by all baak analyata. 
Some use ratioa u a quick check to ccmfU. prior coaclusions, and other a 
admit to uatna them only subconacioualy duriag the analyaia. Ofte analyst 
in a auburbau b&Dk, on the other ha41 uaea a system whereby five ratios 
are computed in all ca.aea. Thia aalyat uses the current, "acid teat," 
aud debt to net worth ratios, aa well aa the tum-over of both inventory 
and accoua.ta receivable. In som.e eaaea, the tum-over ratios are not u.eed 
because they ue irrelevant. lnv8'Dtory tum-over, for example, means 
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no~htna when analyaina a service oraanil&lion which carries no iaventory. 
The ratios are then c_,ared with the staDctard ratios of the Robert Morris 
Associates. If the ratios coraputec! are -aual to or stroqer than the stan• 
dar:cta, no further financial aualpta is uadertaken, except in rare cues. 
This metbocl is defeac:le4 on the aroua4a that the bank is amall, the custo-
mers we11•kMWI1 to the analyst•. 8114 time conaide1ratious on small loans 
wst b:e kept within 1 imita in order to keep expeuea within reason. ltan• 
dard ratios, auch as tboae publlabed by 0.0 & Bradatreet and the Robert 
Monte Aaaocd.atea, are usecl by aaalyeta in five of the seven banka under 
conaidel'ation. 
The ratios in use by the lHmk aualyata aay be arouped into thl'ee 
claaaificationa. The aroupa are 11C(ui4ity, capital, and profit. 22 There 
is ... overlap aona the p:oupa, but the breakdown ia pod for puxpoaes 
of study. Liquttlity ratios mauve tu flw of cash thNUp a buaiaeaa, 
or the aouat of free assets av.U&ble te meet obU.aations at any atven 
time. Thel'e are four ratios 1a the IJ"'UP• all of which are uaed by two 
or 11t0re of the bak aalysta iu.tervi.... The ratios which belona to thi a 
aroup are the current and "acid teat" ratios, u well as the tum-over of 
accounts ~receivable, which is eometiaea coavu~eci into an averaae collec-
t:lon periocl. lnveatory turu•.ver ia the foul'th ratio in the aroup. 
The aecoo.cl poup iACluclea five capital ratios. They are used 
to JllUiure the adequacy of iAadequacy of ia.veated capital. Debt to net 
worth is the only ratio uae4 by tlla bank analysts interviewed. Other 
22 Irons and Belle1110re, .22.• .!!S·, p. 218. 
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ratio& 1nclwle4 in t.hia aroup are: iixed uaet.a to net worth, net. aalea 
t.o fixecl uaeta, net. aalea to WOI'kiq capital, and ules to net WOI'th. 
The third aroup of ratios aeaaurea the profitabilit7 of a buai• 
nua. there are four l'at.ioa in the 8J'Oup, of which three are in u.ae b)' 
the bauk aualyata. The operat.ia,a ratio "' a:peuea to aalea, net profit 
to aalea, ad. net profit to net worth are in uae. Net profit to total in-
VQtaeat ia the fourth ratio. lt. u not. preaentl7 in uae by the bank 
analyeta lnl:ervicwed. 
lat1oa as such aean vel'J U.ttle Ullleas uaed for comparison with 
either the previous year a • atat.~a of the same c0111pany, with thoae of 
other companies in the :f.Ddu.atl'J, or with the atawiard ratios. Coll.p&risoa 
with other aimilar compenies in the Uu:lu.atl'J is difficult becauae of the 
r:ad.ty of ncb cloae af.Dlilarity. OomparUol'l with the inclu.atry end the 
ecODOIIIP ia euler to make bec...,..a data are 110re plentiful from which to 
draw aeneral coucluaiona. l'or uauple, if the ratios ahow that a company 
hal retroareaae4 over a period, the ael'ieuaneaa of the decline can be eval• 
uatecl by c:ompariq the decline with the incluatry or: the ecouomy. If the 
decline waa leas than that of the reat of the induatl')', then the company 
may well be acceptable aa a credit rtak. Oa the other hancl, if the com-
pany retroll'eaau •re thG the iluluatry. then further investf.p.tion is 
undertaken to find the reuon. The queati• then ariaea ae to hov the 
aituation may be correctecl. 
Uafcvorable latioa: 
The bank anal)'ata were aaked to indicate when the variou.a ratioa 
become unfavorule. The ID81fera varied from "rules of thUJib•• to mor:e 
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apecf.fic crited.a. 
A current ratio (current aaseta to current liabilities) of 2:1 
or bettu 1a a "rule of thUIIlb•' which is used 'by the bank analysts, al• 
tboup it ia not considered u lmpoltant today u it once waa. A aeJ:Vice 
1ntluat17, 1\ac:!h u truck tranaportatioa, 1ib.ere the asaeta lean heavily to-
ward capital equipment, 1s DOW couicler4Ml to have a satisfa.ctoey current 
ratio at 1: 1. There are other industries, such as the aanaeat trade a, 
where style is e iutportaut factor, .., a ratio of 3:1 may not be conaicl• 
erecl sufficient. When ratioa were ff.l"at uaed in aualyaina stateaents, 
two aeneral "nlea of thUIIIb" were that the current ruio is un.favor~le 
whea lese than 211 ancl the "acid teat" ratio ia unf&Yorable when leas thaD 
lU. Present day analysts do not place 10 INCh confidence in the "rulea 
of thumb" aa their predecesaora cltcl. 
The rules of ~ aaeatioucl above are not valuable buom.etera 
to the aulyst when use4 alotle. The fact that a balaDCe sheet reflect& 
a current ratio of better that& 2: 1 ta aot aufficient evidence to warret 
a favorable cl."edit decision. On the othe~ haa4, if a balaace lbeet were 
to reflect a current ratio of leta than the at&Ddard. then the aaalyat 
tbould taa.e4iately know that raore than a cwaoey aualysia of the finan-
cial couclition of the credit appU.cant ia requirecl. It is the author's 
opinion that the rules of thuab are only uHful as aipala to the anal• 
yat, and certainly are not the answer to the credit decision. 
A llOre aeneral use of ratios ia for comparison. If a ratio is 
below that of slllilar enteqriHs in the nae iruluatey, or below the atau.• 
darcl ratios, then it is considered ua.favocable. For exaple, a retail 
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dry aooda store may present a atateaent with a current ratio of 4: 1. When 
comparina thU raU.o to the "rule of thumb" or 2: 1, it appeal"& that the 
stateaeat fr010 the current ratio point of view 1a a st.rcma mae. However, 
an ltldu8t1:')" averqe for 77 stores indicates a median current ratio of 
.5 .17. Z3 Therefore 4:1 does not look to favorable from this point of view. 
There are no other "rules of th'UIIIbn in uae with reprd to the 
other l'&tioa bec&\lae each incluatry .appears to have stanclal'ds of its own 
which are not applicable to any other lnclustry. However, a rule uaed by 
one bank aaalyst to indicate a weak coadltiOA is that inventory is areat• 
er than oet workiq capital. 
The bank analysts were al• uked to indicate what period of 
time IIU8t ••• before a deterioration is couiclered sipificant. All 
aaaly1ts aaree that this question caa aot be anwered in &ellel:'al terms, 
but must be answered accordina to a specific aituation. An old•line com-
pany which baa been decUnina for Dl8tlf years, may continue to be a good 
riak for an exteDCled period of time. Such • company mar have built up • 
larae capital surplus and a larse iuveatment in capital goods durtca 
fnltful years on cash proviclecl by Jhrinkiaa assets. the railroads in 
the Unf.tecl State• aemplity such a declf.aiq induatry. Coal has alao auf• 
fer eel a decline. It is a matter of juclaemeot by the analyst to decide at 
what ttme the assets have shrunk beyood the point where credit can be ~ 
tended aafely. 
23aoy A. Foulke, cmMS tER4! 1n tem of Sale, (New York: 
Dun & lrade,reet, Inc., 1957). p. sa. 
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Wcn:kf.D.a Capital: 
Wha wontna capital becOMe sufficiently depleted. the bank 
beatna to look for security for a loan. Mot:e :f.mportan.t, however, is the 
decision aa to how larae the deer .... 1n •rkil\a capital 11U8t be before 
it ia couidered sipificant. Aa-..rs to ~is question varied, but 180st 
analysts aaree that the siae of the bu.aiuaa will have aoaae effect em the 
decision. Generally, as the abe of the business iDCreaaes, siae refer• 
riq to balance sheet criteria, tae -..ller would be the aipificant per-
cenlaae. A further aaeraliaatiGJD vaa that a decrease is sip.ificat 
when it il in exceu of in.dutti'J clecr .... s over the same puioG. One 
anal:vst waa • .-e apecifict statta& that 2.5 per cpt would be a IIWdmu1ll al• 
lovable deer ..... 
The effect of wol'ktaa capital on credit, relative to security, 
is of interest in paasina. Work ina capital can be studied from two points 
of vtaw. t1le first is the aaoat of workiq capital expressed in dollars. 
The aeeond is the tread of workina capital, i. e., whether it is increas• 
il'l& or decreasiq. .Amol.mt of vorki.Qa capital ma:v limit the amount of un-
secured credit. The treud of vorkiq c.apital is an indicator of success 
or lack of IUCCeiS of the mana&ement of the business. 
A "rule of thumb" ia use by aome banks is t~t an unsecured 
loa can be DO larpr th&D. 50 per cent of tbe net worktna capital. This 
••ruJ.e of tht.JIIIb,. may be 110clified by the trend of the wonina capital, with 
a sltabtlJ hiper a:atOunt bein& loan where at:UlU&l increases have been 
noted, aacl soaaevbat less when the trend has been on the decrease. Also, 
the aborter the seaacm or tem of the loao., the hi&her the ratio of loan 
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to world.DI capital allowable. lD aome .,_ial inclustd.es, such as wool 
and 11ill1Jll. loau are pem.ittecl u hi&h as three times the wotkiq capi• 
tal. One l'euoG for the laraer liait la that the merchaadbe which the 
loan will pUI'cbase 1s readily aalabla &t 8S1J time. 
Thee is one o~er limitation oa UDSecured cre4it. Net worth 
em be no leas than equal to total Ubt if a business is to receive un• 
secured baak. craclit. laraks paerally do not like to have more at stake 
in a bua11t.eas than do the owruura. wta. the ratio of debt to net vorth 
will exceed lal, baaks pnerally ask fR encloraements or other foma of 
aecurity before extendin& credit. 
hecedina chaptere have diecuaect the factors which deal direct• 
ly with credit aaalyeis ad deciaioa. The tools ued by the analyst in 
hia waluattoa have 'beea cliecuaae4. Antecedeat factors and financial fac• 
tora which 10 toaether to make up the fac:ta aad conditions on which the 
aulyaie aacl decieiou ue baaed have &leo been iuveattaated. In order to 
coaplece the atwly of credit analyaia, ·. aacl a;o more fully uraderataac:l the 
cootraate and campuiaoae between Dua & lradetreet and the baake, it ie 
neceaaary to diacuas same factors which iadirectly affect the credit anal• 
yaia anct decision. 
The irulire<lt factora IIWit be df.Muased in a subjective JUDner, 
aa their affect on analyais and cleciaios:a caaot be meuured iD quantita• 
tive terme. It it eutirely poeaible that the indirect factor a may have 
DO beariD& on a aive ease& but it ia &lao poeaible that they will be 
aoveratna criteria in the fiDal cleciaioD. 
The iaclirect factora which eDter iDto a cre4it aaalyets will be 
dividecl into three catepriee for purpose• of ditcutaion. The first cate-
801'7, the aaalyet • will include euch fee tore &I per10nality and experience 
which UJ affect an analyat•a clectaf.OQa. The creclit aaalyat ia subject 
to credit policy formulated by hiaber echelou, such as the cos:atroller or 
the creclit maa.aaer. Such ·creclU poltctu, and their effect on the aual• 
yat. will be the subject of eateaoi'J two. The third cateaory of indirect 
factora to be cliacuaaed ia the attitucle of the debtor toward be:I.DS evalu-
ated aa a credit risk. 
The factors to be diacUMecl 1n this chapter have the eae ef• 
feet on the aaalyaia and deei1ioa whether Dun & Bradstreet or the baaka 
are uvolved. Both institutiou have analylta of different personality 
patten&, work habits, aDd f..Uy baclt.p-ouucls. The analysts are sub• 
ject to the same aeneral prea~ea of _.naseaeat policy and decision. 
No atteapt will be Dl&de, therefore, to eoatraat the bank aud mercantile 
analy1ta uatil the followtna chapter on selection and trainina of the 
analyst is reached. 
The Aaalyst 1 
The aaalyst, beina a ia41vf.4ual. is .Uject to any nUIIIIter of 
factors whleh mipt affect hie deciaiou. These factors 11a1 be of either 
the ~ray OJ: penaaaeat type. !empoJ:ay factor•• sueh aa the weather 
or the aaalyst•a healtb, are uject to cheQse almost dally. fenaanent 
factor•• tuch u apel'i.ence and pu80Aalit7, are slow to ch.mae. 8lld may 
never cUD&e at all. It ia the~ type of factors which will be 
the 8\lbject of thia section of the thaaia. 
It ia difficult to aepazate the various factors which may affect 
an analyst • a cleciaiou as the fact.:s which make up the human per80Ulity 
are raot ilulepcdent of each othu. There ia an interaction between a 
man•a ability as an analyst and the technique he employs in his analysis. 
Puaona.lity factors, such as emotional ltability, may interact with the 
aualyat• a attitucles toward the .. ,...._, he interview in ptheri.na hie 
lu.foftlatf.on. Bec.auae analysts are lwmaD the, may 'be expected to react to-
wud a atveu situation diffuent.ly. lD tb.e followtna parqrapbs 1011te of 
the factel'a which may affec~ an analyst' a decisions are cliscussed. It 1a 
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of importaace to keep ia mind that inter~tion amoua the factors extata. 
althouah theJ will be diacuaaed separately. 
An analyat' a ye.us of ex:perieDOe in the field of credit certain-
ly make a difference ia the tools he usea in hia analysis, and may affect 
his d.eciaioaa. ln. order to avoid confusion, the terms junior and senior 
analyat will be used to contrast the relatively new analyst With the vet• 
et:an. the junior analyst is ma4e ••e. of various credit tools du.riaa 
his initial traiaiq. ror e:a.ple, ratios ue aenerally used to analyze 
~· finaactal trend of a bua1De8s. The trainee will alao be tauibt the 
use of standard ratios, principally becauae they point out posaible weak• 
neaaea to the trainee which would not otherwise be eviient to him. Aa 
the trUD.ee aaias experience, he u.y actually atop computiaa the t:atios 
on paper 1 auJ.atituttna iutead, JHDtal calculations. Reaponaes by the 
aea.iot: analyata indicate that thq uae the ratios leaa than the junior 
analysta, some ind.icating no uae of thi1 tool whatsoever. It would ap• 
pear, bowavet" 1 that the aeaior aualysts ake at least an intuitive use 
of the ratioa, although they do a.ot:. actually compute them. The senior 
aaalyata rely on their own knowledae of the various industries under c~ 
aidet"&tion r~ber than any publiahed st«Ddard ratios. The ratios pub• 
lished by Dun & Bradatreet aDd othara are the only source of such infor• 
mation until the trainees aain sufficient kuowledae of the busineaaes and 
tadultries they analyse. The senior analyata alao have better peraonal 
contacts with wham to diacusa and confiza their decisions. Such contacts 
are Ollly pined by apuience, aad the contacts may be an added reaaon 
for the Uaited uae of the buic toola of analyaia used by the senior 
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the aer&.iAn' aulysta are bettu equipped to arrive at the cor-
rect credit ciecilicms durina the atr ... s of the business cycle. Havins 
experienced aore tbaa one receaaion. or inflationary periecl, they seem to 
have intuitive feelina for the differeacea between those businesses which 
will survive the recession extraae of the cycle an4 those which will fail. 
Tha junior analysts have only a sec:.onct-lacld kaewlectae about such extremes • 
and lack the feel in& for such attuatiou •teh only experience providea. 
The seuior aua.lyata have one furtbu acivautaae which also coraes 
by apertenee. Thq have a aeaeral kaowledp of the induatd.es unclu 
aaalyaia which ia first hand. No amouat of outside research by the junior 
ualyata will equalille tbta deficit for that. There are certain indua• 
triea, for __,le, which have probleu all their own. The trucktna in• 
dustq ia a aood exaple. It ia a aenlce industry havin& no inventory 
retailus. l'uther, it ia au tnduatry replated by both fecieral ad lo-
cal J0Vft'1111l81'lt aaaa.cies • and thia repUt1ou acids to the uniqueness of 
the industry. la.owlectae of bow to aul.JU such an imlustry can be obtaiaed 
only by experienc.e, alekouab acae aaenelu have published info1:'DI&tion de-
aiaaed to aid the analyst in tome of the apecialiaed fields. 24 
The work load carriecl by the au.l)'st 1a another factor Which 
uy affect a deciaion. Bvery anal)'at has the preaaures of quantity ver-
aua qualit:.y to bear. The tJPieal credit departflent is uwierataffed to 
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beain with, so the pressure of tiae is always apparent. from peraoo.al 
observation, the writer ia of the opinion that the Boston office of l>un 
& Bradstreet; ~eriei,\Cecl a rather hlp labor tu~over durin& hia train• 
ina. Purthar. tiate p'e•aure ia brouaht to bear by the sales force, which 
doea not want to loae potential ... beeauae of a low credit clearances. 
Ttme preaaure may cause analyata to cut corners in analyain& a credit 
riak, particularly if needed infonaation 11 not readily at hand. One 
fact missed in the iaveati&ation mar be a vital one to the final decision. 
For example, auppoae a ftnancial statement ia aubaitted for credit pur• 
poses. Current aaaeta total one thoUA1UI dollars • and liabilities eon• 
siat of two items, accounts pqable of $250, and a note pqable of $500. 
'rbe analyat may fiaure the current ratio to be either 4:1 or 4:3 depend• 
ina on whether he reads the note pqable to be current or lon,s term. A 
wrona d.eciaion one way or the other could be made due to lack of knowledse 
about this one item. 
The final factor to be taken tato consideration in the thesis 
relative to the analyst is his peraonalitJ. Aeeordin& to personnel mana-
sera interviewed, there doea not .... to be any perfect "credit personal• 
ity." Peeple with various teaper--ta awl attitudes seem to make equally 
&DOd analysts. Such basic pereonality traits aa introvert or e.trovert 
may have aome bearin& on an analyse • a decistona, but an individual's per-
soaality is ao complex that: art.J conelation between this trait and a cor-
rect or incorrect decision camaot be Masured. It is not possible to 
isolate u.y one peraoaality trait froa the complex qstem which ia the 
h\lll&Jl beina. 
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The analyst• 1 attitudes toward the people with whom he is deal• 
iq will definitel7 affect hie decisiou. Attitudea toward the vicea such 
u P'f,lbU.aa anct driakiaa V&r/ conaiclerably. fol" eumple, an analyst whe 
eithu doea not dd.Dk or is perhapa a lllalber of Alcoholics .Monymoua w:l.ll 
not be favorably tmpreaaed with a debtor or potential debtor who does 1~ 
bibe. In contrast, an malyat who does cb:iuk will not 'be neptively bi• 
aaecl towathi a uumapr who cloea dd.ak. hob an analyst will probably not 
let the aatter enter into consideration at all. 
Another factor of couiduable im.port~e ia the emotional ata• 
bility of the analyst. An inclividual Wbo allows hia peraoaal feeltnaa 
to iaterfere With his analysis aa4 deciaten will not make a IOOd aaalyat. 
A buaineaa rill not aeceaauily ba •ucceadul because the manqer has a 
pleaatDa ,.riOD&lity. Neither will a buataeaa fail because the manager 
ia often ill•tempet>ed. A aooct aaalyat will UJ:"ive at an objective and 
fair cleciaion. 
the factors uoted above are not IHGt to be an exhaustive liat. 
Pertonality ia a camplex subject WOdhy of a thesia in itaelf. the fac• 
tors .eationed are only meant to illuatrate the many differences which 
could affect the credit deciaioa. 
Maaaa_.,t DeciaS.OU Affecttna Cbe Aulydz 
Top ..aaaemeRt auat aet up polic7 to auide the anal71t in reach• 
ina hia deciaiona. Policiea auat alao 'be ucle which will maintain credit 
stanclal'ds once they are aet up. '.fbe1e policiea tend to biacl the aal• 
78t • a freedc of dec ilion. However, &he aaalyat ia free to a certain .,.. 
tent in h1• interpretation of the co.pauy peliciea. Interpretatioa of 
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policy may be one reason why aaalyst8 differ in their analysis and de• 
cision on a &iven case. 
Manaaement policies relative to specification of credit stan• 
dards are usually general in nature, leavtaa the actual specifications 
up to a creclit lll&IUl&er. The credit aanapr, in turn, will inatll,'uct the 
credit analysts. Control is usually measured in dollar losses in relation 
to dollar sales. As mentioned previously, the credit manaaer has preaeure 
exerted on him by the sales raanaaer to make fast decisions. Pressure is 
also exerted to aake credit staDdard.a favorable to the customer, so that 
a aale8man's efforts will not be expeaded. needlessly. Of course, there 
is also pressure on the individual credit aDalyst to make all decisions 
favorable. 
One uthod of avoidina the problem. of havina to refuse orders 
on the basis of credit has provecl very suceeseful. The saleiJDlan submits 
names of possible new accounts to the credit department before there is 
aay sales effort. If the decilioa is favorable, the credit analyst seta 
limits on the credit, and the saleaaum may so ahea4 with the client with 
advance knowledae of what credit limitations will apply. If the decision 
ia unfavorable, the salesman may either completely disreaard the client, 
or he may re-submit the prospect after a six month period for reconaidera• 
tion. This system baa virtually elimiaated wasted sales efforts due to 
credit refusal. 
The ol'i&inal specification of the minimum standards may be 
chanaed fol' either one of two reaaons. first, a change in the trend of 
the business cycle may necessitate a chanae in over•all credit policy. 
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If the cycle ia 110Vina towed a raceaaiou, the standards may be raised 
to eliainue IILU'aiDal d.lka. CrMit Uaita may be cut on aoae cuatomera 
aa uother pntectiop.. CD the oChfto haatl, staudarda may be lowered in 
inflat:Loauy titael ou the theory that moac bua1aaeaea are aucceaaful in 
aooc1 tfau. A aecoad reaaon for chaaaiaa the ataAllard.s ia to drop them 
in ordu to facilitate an ezpaneia of aales. An apanaion ia to be ex-
pected in 8004 tiaea, but there ia also a poaaibility of expanaioa clw:ina 
a receaaiu. If inventories are ccmaiderect too large, credit at&Ddarda 
U7 be 4roppe4 teapOI'&rily uot1l the excess is sold. A sliahtly larger-
than-usual loaa due to poor creclit rlaka ia better than larae loaaas due 
to no aalea at all. ODe other r..._ £• lowerina credit ataadarda in re• 
cuaionary tiaea is an eccmoad.c cme. Stadaria are dropped on the theory 
that ealea wUl be attmulated. U the phya:Lcal vol•• of pods told is 
iucn:u..ed. then the campaay will 1a tun buy more aoo<ls from ita own sup-
pU.era. The adclitioaal aalea, it ia UUaoriaed, will 1timu.late a chain 
ruction of buytq. As aalea increaae, p11.tchasea lllUSt increase. The :tn-
creaae in sales aad purchaan will cauae butine•...,_ to chanae frOIIl a 
peaaimiatic outlook, whida puvaila dw:ia& a recession, to an optimistic 
outlook. An optimistic outlook ia uaual.l7 ccmaruoua with inflatioaary 
teD4eac:l.es of ~ 'fCODOII1• 
Maintenance of crecU.t atad.arda u the job of the credit manager 
or loa officer. When loaau beatn to expand in relation to aalu or 
loat, thea it is coaumly tille to curtail credit. The raerchant lllUSt de-
creaM the liae or cut out creclit altogether. The 'b'aaker uw.at decl'eaae 
the line, qk for aecu.rity, or refuse credit. While the maintenance of 
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atandards is pr~rily the responsibility of the credit manaaer, it is 
usually up to the iftdividual cnalyst or loan officer to initiate any 
chaqe. 
Attitudes of Business Manaaemeat Toward leln& &ated: 
Attitudes of business maaasement toward bein& rated ranse from 
the positive attitude where the debtor is aaxious to cooperate to the 
nesative attitude where he may refuse ._. or all information. There is 
a third attitu4e amons debtora••that of one who appears anxioua to coop-
erate, but only to the extent which be thinke will benefit him. The anal• 
yet is faced with the problem of pthutna iufonaation froua all sources. 
Dun & lradetreet analysts feel that the treasurer or manaser of the c~ 
pany be ina aaalyced is the best soucce. Cooperative manaaem.ents present 
very few, if any, problems • 'but aumaaements who tend toward the neptive 
attitude may prove to be difficult about impartins information. 
Debtors who ahow a neaative attitude do so for one of three 
reaaons. rirst, the company is in poor financial condition and aay ratin& 
aivea would be unfavorable ao.yway. ly refusina information, auma.aement 
hopes to aet seme credit, because ••• hOtases will extend credit even when 
info~tion is laektn&. Howev.r, these debtors realize that if the neaa• 
tive ratins and infonaation 11 availalJle, no credit will be extended. A 
second reason for refueins information is that the debtor's coqpetitora 
may uae this infol.'Uiation to the debtor's disadvantage. While this reaaon• 
tna may have aome merit, there is considerable doubt in the author's miad. 
Maaaae&Hilt bas not been convincin& about how such information may be used 
to the detrilllent of the debtor. A third reason submitted by debtor 
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m8Da..-ents is that the compear either bas all the credit it needs. or 
that the CQIBPA'Il'J does Mt aeed aDJ creclit. This IUJ' be a fact at any ou 
JQCII1Jellt ia tbae. The compal\1 may have eatablished all nee4ed channels of 
crecli<t. o~ all pvehaai.na 11141 be 4oae for caah. More often than not, how-
ever • the 4ebtor who claims he has DO .....a. for credit is tqoina to cover 
up a poor finaacial cowU.tf.on. 
The aaalyst is faced wi"" the problem of gatherina infoftUltioa 
from secO'm'l-b.and sources when the w•aaemeat takes the nept(ve atti.tw:te. 
At but auch infonaation will be aketchJ. The analyst must make hie de• 
cision from inadequate and incomplete infomatiOD, and it is possible 
that deeisive inforrnatioa will be lacktna. Analysts will geaeral.ly rate 
such cues as conservatively as pou.Dle, so that a C.OIIlPaJ11 wi.th the nep• 
tive ... ltude mar possibly receive a lower claaaification than way be de-
aet'Vacl, 
By far the majority of ~in..,.a take the positive attitude 
ad lUke a visible attflllDPt to maf.DU.irt a pod credit retina. Modem buai• 
neaamen reau ... that tbewe 11 a lot to 1M aamd by cooperation, and cre-
dit irtf .... tion ia beneficial to all. lome marcbanta will offer aeaiatance 
to debtors who are in a taaporarily weak-..cl financial con41tiou, because 
cbey feel CUt the C¥is1a is t.elllpftaey and there will be a pocl chance for 
future aalea. At the worst, .-ueh an ext.-..lon of creciit is a calculate4 
riak. 01\ the other han4. the aaae M'tebaats will probably he$itate about 
extadia& Cl"edlC where inforaaaticm u lacktna. 'beea.uae the nature of the 
rt.k ~t be calculated. There u DO profit in aasiatina a bus1neaa 
which u to weak that it ia beJOD.d tbe point of aalvaae. 
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There is a third ca~eaory of buainess management which causes 
the analyst a areat deal of trouble. lortunately, this catesory accounts 
for only a small percentage of riak1. This is the manaaement which will 
only release the favorable information, thus presenting a false picture 
of credit worthine1s. This type of manaaement may, in fact, even resort 
to unethical tactics, such as "wiDdow dreasina'' on the financial state-
menta. The "window dressing" may be only an attempt to present the best 
financial picture possible, but it can also be a form of falsification. 
"Window dressing' is an attempt to illp'l'ove the appearance of a financial 
statement by either off•aettin& asset and liability accounts or padding 
assets, usually the inventory or receivable accounts. Inventory valua-
tion techniques are one form of window dressing Which was explained in 
chapter IV. If the analyst is ucle aware of this valuation technique by 
management, it is not a dishonest form of window dressing. However. if 
the valuation technique is disaui4e4, the statement could be classified 
as diabonest. If a balance sheet reflected $100 of current assets and 
$50 of liabilities, the current ratio would be 2:1. If a $25 loan was 
offset by $25 of cash, there would be $75 of current assets and $25 of 
liabilities, which would reflect a current ratio of 3:1. The one-man 
proprietorship may increase the assets by mixing personal assets with those 
of the business. Padding the assets wou14 improve the current ratio in 
a similar manner. Window dressing is also used on the income statement. 
One example is the inclusion of income from sources other than sales, 
such as interest, under income from sales. Such a practice will reflect 
padded earninaa on the assets of the business. There are various other 
aethods of padding and window dressing, but fortunately, very few busi• 
ness manaaements resort to such deception. The analyst must be ever on 
the lookout for such practices. 
Chapter VI baa d ...... rated .ut there are three iallirect fac-
tors which IU'1 affect a credit clecisiol\. ODe factor ia the aulyst • hia-
ae.lf. aad the other two influeac.e the WAJ lD which the anal)'at perferu 
his ciuti.es. The credit uoapr ad aalea force pruaure hill for fut, 
accurate cled.aiou. Maoa...-t of .,.. of the \n.uai.Deaaes he aoalyaes 
triu to cteeeive hila. There appear• to he ao apeci.al type of peraoa w1lo 
makea the beet aaalyat. Diffed.q peraoaaU.tiea and attitudea are ea-
bibf.ted by aal.)'eta. If t'bue ia ao apec:ial type of It credit peraouU.c,. •" 
thea it ia poeiiltle that there ue certain 'lualitiea ill any aan which may 
&lake him a aooct aulyet. 
The ~se of the preaeat chapter ia to fiDel out what qual.i• 
ties the ,_._..1 mauaer looks for vhen hirioa a credit traf.Dee. Also, 
it is of :I.Dtenat to 118CertdA what uthode of ae.lectlcm are used. The 
latter portiona of the chapt• will be devoted to metbo4a of trainina the 
analyst, beeaue traiDilla raay well be the key to the buildlna of aoo4 _.. 
alyata, with reaulUaa aooct CJ."eclU: tlecieiou. 
Selectioa: 
Tbe appnac.h lD selectiq a aew maa for a position iD the cre-
4it 4epadlaeat 4epeads. ftnt, upoa tbe type of credit position open ad, 
secoad, upoa the type of traiataa pJ'OP• available by the pcticulaz: com-
,_, or bank. Two types of aulyst are foun4 in the credit department. 
The first lilA)' be cateaorhed aa a career analyst or apecialiat wboee job 
18 punl,. of a clerical, coarputatiaaal, aacl aaal.ytical utvre. The aecon.cl 
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type, called the credit•loan analyse, is more than just an analyst. His 
work includes customer contact in a sales and service capacity. The spe-
cialist type requires a man with certain technical skills and analytical 
abilities. He is probably beat selected by the use of written testa and 
a minimuaa of interviewing. The credit•loan analyst must have a personal• 
ity which is adaptable to sales and the handling of the bank or other 
company customers. Such a man is beat selected, using present~day tools, 
with a minimum of testing and with more emphasis on the personal inter• 
view. It is the credit•loan type of analyst which the banks, as well as 
Dun & Bradstreet, now seek. 
If the company or bank aeekina an analyst is large and facili• 
ties for training are good, then an inexperienced person may be selected 
as a trainee. Testing and interviewa will suffice as screening devices. 
However, if the credit department is Bm&ll and training facilities limited, 
an experienced credit man will be needed. Work references on the candi• 
date will probably be one of the most important criteria of selection. 
The interview also will be important, but testing will play only a minor 
part in selection. Testing uaually is employed to demonstrate a candi• 
date's abilities, where the candidate has had no previous work experience. 
Work experience and the work reference are the beat indicators of a candi-
date's abilities. 
An analyst for any type of credit department must now be a 
salesman in the sense that he must sell his company or bank to those with 
whom he comes in daily contact. He muat be able to give the customer more 
than just a "yesn or "no" answer. The "no" answer is particularly awkward 
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to hauclle, becau1e it must be atvea in auch a way that the bank or mer• 
chant will not lose the customer. 
Jrerequiliteat 
Certain prerequisites must be met by a candidate in any job• 
aeekiq aituation. The credit aualyat c81M1idate finds no exception. Both 
the banks and the aerchanta couidel' a colleae eciucation a neceaaity. Tbe 
major courae of thia education ia ~terial, but a buaineaa adminiatra• 
tion major will have a decided edae la uoderatandtna the problema to be 
faced in the future. Traintna which tacludes a baaic courae in account• 
ina ia of coo.1idera'ble value to the can4idate. However, both the mer• 
ehanta and the banka have hired a peatel' a\llllber of eandidatea with de-
ar••• in the arte than with dear ... ia buaineae administration. 
Dun & Bradstreet preaeutly employe six analytical reporter& at 
the Boaton Office. Four of the atx are colleae araduates, and a fifth has 
had special trainina in accounttna. li&nificutly • the younaeat is over 
forty year• of aae. The two au.alysts without colleae deareea were hired 
oefore the colleae requirement oecae effective. The aaeacy has maintain-
ed the policy of hirina only celleae araduatea aince prior to World War 11, 
except in rare inatucea where a uaan has WOI'ked up throuah the ranks from 
a poaition such aa file clerk. Such a pei'IOD may oecome a city reporter, 
but not an analytical reporter. 
ltatiatica relative to education were not available from the 
o&Qka, but all trainee& for the credit department• have been eolleae arad• 
uatea. The various peraonael IIUU188•r• interviewed ..:elated that lea a than 
one half of the trainees have had business training, and a very amall per• 
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centage of trainees have completed araduate programs, although some have 
completed graduate studies while employed at the bank. 
Education is a losical prerequisite. There are, however, some 
illo&ical prerequisites. Family backsround is one. Many banks consider 
a candidate partly on the basis of the volume of business he may brins to 
the bank throuah his family and friends. However, the banks do not gener• 
ally hire on the basis of family alone. 
The profile; 
The various credit and peraoanel managers interviewed were asked 
to describe the profile of the ideal credit analyst personality. All ~ 
phasilsed that there is no one profile of an ideal analyst. Two men can 
be equally sood analysts, yet h.ve almost opposing personalities, atti• 
tudes, and working habits. However, in the process of selection, the in• 
terviewers do look for certain qualiti .. in potential credit analysts. 
The candidate must present a clean, neat appearance in both per• 
son and dress. Thh quality is especially important for the credit• loan 
trainee in the bank, who eventually will ~e dealing with the bank's fin• 
est customers. He will be a salesman as well as a service consultant and 
must create a favorable impression of competence and trust. The Dun & 
Bradstreet analyst, while not primarily workina in a sales capacity, must 
meet the public to gather information. He must create a favorable im-
preseion amona those he meets in order to win the favor of his sources of 
information. Other personal qualities are not so easily identified. The 
candidate must show some self•aaaurance and confidence in himself, which 
is a quality needed for all positions of responsibility. He must show a 
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mature interest and attitude towed hie vocation, and. in his thinkina in 
aenual. A caad.iclate who hu deD~~~~~Latrated hia desire and need of an edu-
cation ia usually 1110re desirable than a candidate who baa received hia 
eclueatlon on a a:Uver platter. The can4idat.e who baa had to work part 
t~ to put hiaself throuan school ta more likely to take a more serious 
attitucle towucl hie work end life. lqoncl the few qualities raeutioned 
here, the peracmael manaaera ..,...e unaltle positively to identify the man 
they want. 
Selectien Methode: 
The purpose of thia HCtion is to enmaerate the aethocla by whieh 
the vad.oul peraono.el uaanaaera 1elec' their candiclates. Selection methocls 
vary only aU.pc.ly aona th• various iaatitutione involved in thia thesis. 
The iateniew is the 1101t izaportant tool in use. but teattaa, wol'k and 
peraoaal references, and school &1'aclea alao welSh in the final declaion. 
All of the inatituti.ou l'elJ oa the per10nal interview-•aome of 
thea, eaeluaively. laforu.tion aatberf.Mt ill thia Dl&1Uler ia aeurally 
weipted at over 80 per cent of the entire waluatlon. Tbe interview is 
c.OIIIIlOQly baaed em. an application for _,lo,..nt 01: reeuae of the can4idate. 
The interviewer atteqpta fir.t to clear up any questionable points raised 
in the appU.o.at:l.on or resume eo that he will have a clear picture of an 
unbi'Oken chain of event a in the u.e. of the cand:l.clat•, fram hie hip 
adlool ctqa to the pruent. At the aae time • the interviewer ia able to 
fom aa illpreaaicm of the candiclate' • appearance and personality. 
In oJrclel" to avoid enol'a in jucla...-t and. favoritism, the tech-
nique of ~he mltiple interview baa COlle into use. Thia provide• an 
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initial ott ecreeJU.na, interview, usually with a peraormel office:r. If a 
candidate has no obvious faults, he may be asked to talk with at least 
one more member of the aanaaeaent team. l>un & Bra4street makes use of 
four interviews at the Boston Office, with the reaional manqer ineludecl 
as the final interviewer. The baDka aenually use three or four inter• 
views, by divisional or clepartuntal aanaprs, and at least one by an 
officer of the bank. is included. In 'both eases the interviewe~:s meet as 
a sroup to diacuaa the candUate and anive at a joint cleciaion. 
Tutina: 
Dun & Bradstreet and Hill& of the banks make use of various 
teats to auide the interviewers in the selection process. The teats are 
of two types, peraooality and intelliaance testa. It is emphasised by 
all peraonnel manaaers that the testa are only auides and not an ead in 
tbeaselvea. Aa a matter of fact, it waa noted that a number of candi• 
dates who failed the teats were later hired on the basis of interviews 
alone. In other cases, where teace are o.ot used, all hirina is baaed on 
the interviews alone. 
Peraoualtty testa in uea are of two types. First there are 
pure peraonality testa, which attempt to reveal basic traits, for example, 
whether the caadidate is aenerous or h'uaal, an introvert or extrovert, 
or hipstruna or easy•aoina. These testa are weak, because they lllUSt be 
intqTeted by puaous who are DOt piJ'Choloa1ats; thus; readinas are sub-
ject to inaccuracies. The most popular of these tests with the banks is 
the Activity Vector Analysis series. Dua & Bradstreet uses the Gilford• 
Martin indices of personality. Both tests purport to show the same 
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'-bhtp. Their accuracy has aever laeen verifie4. Users of these teats re-
port varied success with them. "their accuracy probably will never be pro-
ven with any 4earee of certatntJ. The second type of personality teat is 
the Kuder Pt'efueaee 'l'est. This test iladieate• a caa4idate~a vocational 
interests ill such fields as clerical won: ancl social work. Dun & Brad• 
stnet ia the onl7 qency inceniwed ~re,ortill& use of this tool. 
latelliaence tests have p~:even .. re accurate in their ability 
to accompluh their job. 'fhey generally ue made up of a vocabulary test 
and a clerical teat. The latter la used to indicate apeed and accuracy 
in detail haacllina. One bank &lao ukea use of a test in arithmetic and 
simple pnbleaae which do aot ~require the use of alaebra, as a further 
test of lf8ed and accuracy. These teats are helpful only as screenina de• 
vices. Teate ta use are eaay enou,ah, and all candiclatea of the c:olleae 
level ehould be ale to acore in tile ninetieth percentile or better. Tbe 
teat• will only separate those who are acceptable from those who are not. 
lcertaa ia not sufficiently detailed to inclicate sisnificant differences 
amoaa candidates who fall within the acceptable ranae. A candidate will 
do ao better than hie true capacity OD the teats. However, a candiclate 
wbo does aot do well due to ill•health or some other reason c:oul4 be ruled 
unacceptable whea in reality he m.a.y be a prime c&Gidate. 
Anothu screentna device uMCI by the banks is the personal re-
fereacea. 'lbe7 are used to obtain a .ore objective picture of a candi• 
date. and to obtain au opinion of those aot related to the series of in• 
tervi .. a. lefe~ences aubmitted by the C&Ddidate muat be used with a 
dep:ee of caution, u the candidate will aubait only the n.amea of pertons 
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he knows will be inclined to create a favorable impression. llefereuees 
secured from aourcea not eolic10d from the caudidate are liable t.o pr .. 
sent a more objee.tive evaluation. Work references are valuable if the 
candidate is not a recent colleae paduate who possibly baa no work ex• 
peJ:ieace. Work references will aenerally atve an oltjective picture of 
the cadidate, as peraoual frierulahipa are leas likely to be involved. 
Tbe fourth acreeniDS device is easily obtained and may be very 
useful. This ia a copy of tbe caruU.clate1 s pa4ea from pl'eparatory school 
&ad coUeae. ltuden~a whose ovQ•all pade averaae is in the upper one 
third of their eolleae claaa ue prefened, but atudenta in the upper 
half and lower are often acceptable. The ~acte trara.acripta are often aaore 
than just a •aaure of a student • a success at the colleae level. The 
aradea in the m.ajor courses should averaae hiper than the student • a over• 
all averqe. Good aradea often are a key to student interest, &ad poot:; 
&radea may staaifJ eithet a lack of tnter.,t or a troublesome area of 
atudy. 
TraiDJ.na of the Analyst: 
After the po'tnt1al anal7at hat been hired, there is a lona aact 
arduous job of tratntaa him. fte trdniq u.y take any or all of three 
fol'lll. Firat, there is orientaUon trai.nina, or aa 11\troduction to the 
new job tlu:'oup preUainary infonatien and instruction. Second, on•tb .. 
job tl'ainina acquaint a the traiaee with the routine taaks of the job. Af• 
ta.' maaterma a specific fuacticm, he aay be advanced to 1110re demaractina 
functions • and this procesa eOiltinuea until he attaint a superviaory or 
unaprul post. 'L'De third Col:ll of traf.n.iq is fomal traintna, which 
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usually takes place in 1011l8 aort of claaaroom. training is necessary not 
onl7 to break. in the new eaplo7ee, 1tut to iluprove capacitiea of expert• 
enced members of the department. 
Orientation trainina takes place in practically wary credit 
department. It includes such diverse subjects as company benefits to the 
employee, like pension fuods aa4 sick leave. It also includes, instruc• 
tion in the use of various company b•alaeas forma, such as the compara-
tive balance sheet form. this traiain& will include instruction to ac• 
quaint the trainee with the credit depar~t's relations with other de-
partments of the company. An introduction to customer relations may also 
be included. 
On-the-job trainina il by l.ar the most popular type in use to-
dq. Its coat to the company is low, but it is popular also because no 
other form of trainiq can substitute for uperience pined on the job. 
On• the-job trainiq is currently J.eina used in two ways, both of which 
are worthy of further deac'C'iption. 
the first way trains a .an for a specific position and is used 
by Dun & Bradstreet atona with moat of the b&Dka. It couaences after the 
orientation trainina is completed and continues until the candidate reaches 
maaaprial or auperviaory levels. Dun & Bradstreet issues to the new em-
ployee a reportel''s handbook on which he may spend two or three daya of 
study. Be then accomp8Pies an experieaced reporter fol' a few da,s to 
&ain expuience in data collection 8Dd techniques of interviewiq. Next 
he f.a aiven a very silllple cue to hao.dle-a case that he may have to re-
analyze aDd re•write a number of ttaes before his supervisor is satisfied. 
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The trainee' a eupervisor actually acta u a director of trd.nins. ae all 
new aen are under his direction. The trainee ia &iven more difficult · 
eases aa he proareaaea, until finally be ia able to handle a sufficient 
quantity of quality work. At tU.t ti.lte, he is alli&ned to a territory 
under another supervisor. 
The •etond step in the cUah towud analyst is the City lleviaion 
depart1181lt • which reports JIIOre complicate4 and active cases. These eases 
are revised twice yurly. Upon satisfaeto~ completion of this aasip• 
ment, the reporter is ready for the Analytical Department. 
There are no specific tiM requirements for a candidate to com-
plete his traiain& in each clepartaeat, but two JUra &enerally is a mini• 
mua apprenticeship before a trainee is ready for the Analytical Department. 
The first 4ays in that department are used to failiarise the reporter 
with the special format of the Anal.J'ica.l Report. Like a cub reporter, 
he starts on uncomplieatecl caeea. This is not always posaible, however, 
l»ecaue of the heavy work lo. of the cleputaent. The cases be analyzes 
are closely scrutinized by the aalytical auperviaor. The trainee com-
moo.l.y requires about six mont:Aa of close au,.rviaion before he is able to 
work on his own. 
The banks &anerally follow the pattern aet by Dun & Bradstreet, 
except that preUainary trainina _,. be aore aeneral. to acquaint the 
trainee with all of the phaaea of bankina. The trainina proaraa of The 
Firat National Bank of Boa ton ia a po4 eumple. The time periods incli• 
cate4 for each pl1ase of trainin& are considered to be averages only. The 
trainee beatna wi.th a three months orientation trainina in the various 
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c~edit•loan departments, becoataa familiar with the entire operation and 
all types of credit. This traiaiaa :l.nclucles familiarisation with fac• 
tol'ii\J and inten.ational credit. The aecOtUI ph&ae, of about one year• s 
duration, ia in the commercial credit department. The trainee learns the 
techniquu of statement aa.alyaia aa4 tha eources of credit information. 
He also learns to write collection aad other letters. The third phase of 
traint.na ia a aix-montha atay in each of the internaticmal, factortq, and 
freipt paymata departm.enta. The latter deputment trailla the c&l1Clidate 
in salea promotion by puttina him in coa&act with some of the smaller cua• 
tomera of the bank. The fourth etep 11 to train the analyst aa a credit 
apectaliat. Here, the trainee work• OR term loans to amaller companies 
and aeae~ally aeaiata more experienced credit•loan officers. Thia phaae 
ordiuu:l.ly laata about two and oae-half yeara. Moat of the other larae 
urban and auburban b&l'lka train theil' aualyata alona aillilar linea. 
The aecona plan of on• the- jeb bainiUJ ie uemplified by the 
pretar• ia aimed at ta-aintna men to be av...-all baak.ere rather than quaU.• 
fyina them for a specific position. !he trainee may have a pl'eference for 
a epecific poaition, but he baa no auarautee of attainina that objective. 
The trainee apeada the first 12 or 18 montba on a rotattaa orientation to• 
ward baaldq in aeaeral. Dur:l.UJ tl\ia pes-iocl he apeada vazytna amounta of 
time :l.u each of nine diviaiona, such aa the credit and loan diviaion, the 
treaaurer'a diviaion, and the truat diviatoa. He ia expected to become 
acquaiuted with the opes-ationa and puaoaael of each division. The loua• 
eat orieatatloa for all traiDeea takea place in the credit department, 
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the trainini lutiaa irom three to four 11011tha. Each oi the nine clivi• 
alOil&l unaaera, u8Ually vice-prea1ctellta, make an evaluation of the train• 
ee while he la in the clepartmeat. No trainee baa a specific a11J.a,maent 
or pr.Uae of aaaipment before enterin& t.he proara.. Upon completion of 
the proar• the report a of the nih cliviaion unqera. alona with the 
trainee• a prefel:'eacea, are evaluatecl in placina him in a poaition. He ia 
then uaip.ed to • auperviaor under vba apecia.U.aed, on-the-job tl:'ainin& 
beatu. 
The aeneral or specific ~the-job trainin& proarame are in uae 
by all bank. a and credit departaeuta. The apecific type trainillg ia by 
far the 1101t popular • eapacially in tile aallu iutitutioaa. 
ronal Traintna: 
i'orul traiutq ia liven oal.J apaniualy by the institutions 
considered in this thesis. It may take many foma, the moat popular of 
which ue oorreapoudenc:.e courses, cluaroam insti'UCtiou, and cue study. 
Dun & Bradatreet offara a fifte~week correspondence courae in 
credit analyaia, which ia aimed principally at finaacial statement aaaly-
aia. Thia course is open, at a ver,r reaeonable fee, to aar person wbo 
viahea to earoll. To eaployeea of the aa.ncy with aix montha or more of 
aervice, the course :1a offered free of ch&t'ae, if recOIIIIlencled by IIUU\a&"e• 
meat. hue of the bank a reported uae of such a course, and a nuraber of 
the bankera were uuawue that auch a courae exiata. 
Cluaroom inati'UCtion, aa auch, ia not in uae to any p-eat ea• 
tent in the banka, except for an occu:1ona1 seminar. There are probably 
not enoup trainee a in any oae baak to lUke auch a proaram feasible. 
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However • the Boston chapter of the Amel'ican Institute of lankin& offers 
a number of c.ouaes in aeneral butiness ad baokina. These are offered 
in the eveaJ.aa duina the. winter 11011ths. The baoks all support this or• 
pniaation. aacl u.ny of them take advantaae of the instruction by sencU.na 
trainees to the cluses at baak npme. The insti"W:tors are either lo-
cal l:umkers or business aacl profusioaal aaea of considerable experience. 
In some instmoes, the \tanks aencl e~~pleyees to the local colieae and uni~oo 
versit;y ev•ina diviaions for epecialiaed COUI'Ses. However. these aen 
are usually hqond the status of tl'ainee. 
The third type of fonaal ll'aiaiq ia not iD use locally at the 
present time. It is mentioned hel'e iecause of its succees in other parts 
of the country, notably ou the Welt Cout of the United States where banks 
are attaaptin& uaa education clue to the uo.uaual demand for men in the ex-
pandina branches. The caee study method of teachina ia advocated because 
it ia relatively inexpeulive, does not tlke much executive time durina 
busineaa hours, aacl complements on-the-job trainina. A JOOd eumple of 
ita uae is the plan followed b7 tl\e Sec.uity Firat laU.onal Bank of Cali• 
fornia. Briefly, the bank was coal~e4 with the problem of trainin& a 
larae staff of aanaaers for tllS$tJ-od4. uw branches to be opened ia 1960. 
The men hacl to be trained in a mizdmum of tiae, yet trainina had to en• 
c.ompus m&ny phues of bald.ua. 
A series of problems were put to &ether, some of them actual 
u.ses, whieh are illust.rative of variou problema of bauldna. Each rri• 
day, the ..-.. of the atucl7 Lt'oup were aiven a ftitten syaopaia of the 
pnbl• to be cliacusaed the folloviJla week. The student solved the probl• 
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to the beat of hu ability, and wote hla 10lution, to be puaed in to a 
1104lerator for coneet1on. On the followina friday, the group met with a 
moderator, usually an officer of the baDk, to diaeuaa the problem. The 
dtacuaa1on aroup had auff1eient t~ to pwobe fairly deeply into each pro-
blem. The IIOClerator entered into the dltcuaa1on only to correct enoneoua 
ideas not conected by the poup, and directed the d1scuaaion toward im-
port8llt couf.clerationa. The student ...tJera of the aroup are evaluated 
by the JIOCierator on both oral 8lld witten preaentati.oaa. The bank has 
enjoyed a areat deal of aucceaa with thia method of inatruetion with a 
miaimuaa of GJqHm&e ancl executive t::iae loat. 
Althouah ncme of the local banke are uain& this method at pre-
aent, 1UDJ of them have uaecl it 1a the paat. Some of the traini.Da direc-
tor a f•l tbat it 1187 pl'OVe to 'be a u.aelul tool qain, altbou&b the lack 
of ~t back ina aay alov it • a rebirth. 
The thoia bas dealt at s0111e lqth with the variov.a factors 
which make up the credit decision. It baa been susaested that certain 
baaic differences between the purpe.. of the Dua & Bradstreet analysis 
and the beak analysis may make a difference relative to the decision ren-
dered on a atven case. Different aaalyata react differently to some ad• 
verae })ehavior patterns of raanaaeraeat. 'lh., appear t.o use the aazu tools 
of creel it analysis, altbouah the vetez:oau aaalyat uy make only an intui• 
tive use of the tools. Aualyata woulcl prol>ably react alike in their z:oe• 
actiona to baalu:uptcy, fraud, and other weuts actverse to a company, if 
the profit motive did not affect the thiDkina of the bank analyst a. The 
bak. and the a&GMJ ~hods of cz:oeclit eaalyaia have been contruted and 
compared. It is the purpose of this final chapter to auaaeat some poai• 
tive aeaaa of illproviq the quality of the work of the credit department. 
It woulcl seem that there are only ... possible paths to improve• 
wmt. rtrat, there JU7 be some way to i.Jiprove the tools of aa.alyaia now 
in use. leccm4, there uy be wqa to illprove the lmowledae and uility 
of the aaalyat, who is really the key to the action of any credit deci• 
aion. 
the Tools: 
The tools of the credit analyst, such as ratio analysis and 
ff.na.cial atat..a.ta, have been in use for uuy yeara. Any recently pro-
poaecl additiona have actually been refiaellleats of exiatini tools. For 
example • Al.euuder Wall, a promiaent a.abez:o of the B.obert lbrris A.aaociates, 
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aclvecated an index of credit which •tahted the varioua factors of a cre-
clit ritk on a quantitative buis. Basically, it was a refinement of ratio 
analysu, but the qualitative factol's wue accounted for in the inclex. 
Theoretically, if the computed imtex fi~Ue waa leas than one hundred, 
then no credit was to be extended. Hawever, tbe index nevu aatned any 
popularity amoaa the credit analysts because it was too inflexible, es• 
pecially in its haudU.na of the quU.tative factors. such aa character of 
the manaaement. The Where-sot, Wbu .. pu statemeut waa devisect to show 
the analyat at a &lance the 80Urcea anct uaea of funda within a buaineas. 
One refineJOellt of the atateaent wu the uae of percentaae relativea which 
facilitated comparison with other s-.teaeats of the same concern. The 
tt~d ratioa compiled by The Babezt Mowria Associates, Dun & Bradstreet 
and others ue a refineaent aa.d e--.ion of atraiaht ratio analysia. 
The uae of the standard ratios ia plebably the moat sisnificant step fa-
ward in credit analyais in the twentieth century. 
There ia no reason to believe tha any really new tools of cre-
dit an.alyaia will be forthcamiq. llaphaaia • then, must be placed upon im-
provin& and refiniq the toola preaeatly in uee. There is certainly room 
for illlprovement in the stanctard ratio a aow ill use. Their areatest weak• 
neat lies in the fact that there ia a 1- tilae lq between the date on 
which the clata for the atanclaria are pu'bU.ahed and the appearance of the 
campoaite ratioa themaelves. The areatel' the lag, the lesa the uaeful• 
nesa of the staudud ratios. Certdaly the Dull & Bradstreet ratiot of 
1157 were next to uaelesa to the aoalyat by the time they were publiehed 
in 1159. 
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The finaacial atUeaaeDt.l Oil which the standard ratioa are baaed 
are aaethu tool of the analy1t wh14h hu a peat DUIDJ possibiU.ties for 
i.mprov~. Two buic i.mpt.'OYaaeaU would seem to be feasible, and, foJ:-
tuaately, both are well recopized by accowtanta and others in the field 
of finaaoe. Pi~:st ia the need for a ,etanclud system of accountf.ns, es-
pecially relative to co1t ay1tems. ltaacla~:d ratios baaed ou atatelllellta 
ustna differ~ iaventory valuations are aot truly representative atand• 
ucla. Per example, two fitu may baYe ideuical iaventories, but balance 
sheet fisurea may differ markedly because oae firm uses the LIFO ayatem 
and the other. the ruo ayatc of valuatiou. Duriua an tuflattonary peri• 
eel, the LDO SJ&tem preHata an uatlervalued inventory in terms of replace-
utent. In receaaionary times the saae valuatioo. ayttem may show an over• 
valued iaveatory 1a t4m!la of replac-.t coat. As the result of an 1nven• 
toq betna under-valued • which is the uaual cue in recent years under the 
LifO qat•• the aaaeta and workiq capital ratiot will appear lower than 
those of other finla which value iuvea.t;oq uina the ruo system. 
Pf.D.aac:f.al atatemeo.ta have a aeoond recopuett weaknesa in that 
thq ate often not audited. lven aditecl aktem.ent.a may have weakneaaea 
becauee of the auditor's reaervationa about certain ftaures on the atateoo 
ment. Unaudited statements may be o« excelleat quality or they may be 
little better than casual eatimatea of tke financial condition of a busi• 
neaa. Unfortunately, the credit analyat baa no wa, of differentiatin& be• 
tween the eat£aatea and the aroaa aiarepreaeatationa. He ¢&n verify only 
a few of the atateaent itaas. Audited statement• in which the analyat 
has more confUeac:e are aometim.ea subject to weakneaaes. If the auditor 
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muat accept an inventory fipre from ....., .. t without confinati.on, 
tbue ie reatorl for the analyet to have leas confidence. An inventory 
taken unc!er the auditor• s aupuvision is to be preferred. Aceount:s re• 
ceivable which are verified by the auditor also .ake a stronger atatement 
in the eyea of tbe analyet. The _..,Pit etatement may be a reaaouhle 
preaeatatlon of the facta, but analyeu ar:e more confident when the audi• 
tor has &tven hie unqualified cU'tificatioa. Statements which are incor-
rect will aleo affect the validit7 of the atandard rat:loe, although not 
markedly. 
The 4merictm Institute of .Accountaats and other oraaaiaationa 
of profeaeioul accountaate reooaniae the weakneaaee in present accOUI\tina 
practices. While theee oraataationa .. 'l'ive to ilap'l'ove practices, the 
manaa-flllts of the businesses which do aat use the pt:ofeseional account• 
ant ue the only onee who can ~:eally iatpnve the situation. These manage-
JUnta cu help by aaploy,l.na the MI'Vicea of trsined accountants and audi• 
tore. 
The Malyeta: 
Selection and t'l'aintaa preeeut the best opportunities for ~ 
provtna the quality of credit aaalflia. lltprov•ent may be accampliahad 
f.n the teehniquea of selectina aew CJ:aineea, but traf.nin& of both the new 
aad the experienced analysts preaeRte a wide open field of poesibilities. 
lelectiOIU 
Selection proceeeea usecl todq by· the local banks and othc 
cJ:edit 4eputmeate e11phaaiae the pereoual interview approach. Some 01 
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the inatitutloaa are expertmentlag with various personality and intelli• 
a-ce tealill for use aa acreeaina clevicu. The personal and work experiace 
refere&\C.ea are also in uae, but they are of little aid in evaluating a re• 
ceut eollqe ~aduate who baa no work experience behind him. Grades earned 
by the candidate as a student in eutlle&e are 110re useful in evaluating the 
abiU.c.y of the student applicant. 
Tile fereonal interview ia the beat approach at present mainly 
'becauae of the weakness of other Mlection t.\ools. The multiple interview 
with the resulttR& ecmaittee-type &election hu improved this syatem. How-
8\J'et the lose of executive time • eapeci.ally where several officers are in-
volved, ia likely to prove costly. 'fhqoe is need, then, to build a aelec• 
tion ayat• which will de-emphaaue the peracmal interview. 
PeriOa&lity and tntelliaeaee testta& appears to be the beat aolu• 
tion to the problem. Intelliaeac:e testlq baa 'become a fairly reliable 
tool, altbouah it baa two weakneaaea. Pirat, the tests preaeatly in use 
4o not cliffereatiate between the beat and the worst of those candidates 
who ue found to be acceptable. The aeoond. veakneaa is that a sood earuU.• 
date who does not respond well to the tut at a particular: time for reason 
of illness or worry may score lower thin he normally would. Perhaps mul• 
tiple teaU.q ie an answer to this flaw in the system. 
The pueoulity teats are at best 1a the experbaeatal ataae. 
lf a cao4idate baa any knowledse of tbe pnfile for which a company is 
looktq, he uy be able to slant his ....,. ... toward such a personality 
patten. Of course t it may be arped tllat the candidate ia not helpina 
himael.f ~ ao alantin& the teat, u he would undoubtedly prove to be a 
llli.lfit a a credit aulyat abould he be lliaoed in that capacity. A further 
weakaeaa of the personality t .. t ia tbaC special trainiq f.a needed to 
.. read'' t:he reaulta accul:'ately. It ia caueactonable if a l&JIUll is campe-
tant to aUU~~~Uiae the l'eaulta of the teat accuately when it ia l'eportecl 
that trained psycholoaiata are not convinced of the complete validity of 
the testa. The readera claim varioua re&lllta an.cl correlation between the 
teat reacliuaa aut actual observed pn.eu... There ue no kl10Wil ccm.cluaive 
results relative to the validity of peraoaality teattns. 
Traintna: 
Trat.ntns ia generally of the on-the-job type, altboup some 
fcmul lnatruction ia uaecl in the baraka, in the form of American lnati• 
tute of JaDld.q courses. On•the-joh traiuiq is a slow process at beat, 
awl baa proven tudequate in areas of lara« expansion, such aa the West 
Coast of the United States. It ia especially inadequate when not accom• 
panted by a plaanecl curriculum. It ia further U.suted by the fact that 
it 1a slow to weecl out puscmnel wbo were iD.conectly aelectecl to beatn 
with. It alowa clovn the work of the arperieacecl analyst who rauat direct 
the WO'l'k of the trainee. It ia alao of dubtous value in train:I.D.& the 
more exped.encecl aaaly1ta for supe'I:'ViiOry or ID8Il.Aplllel\t posts. On•the• 
job trainiq hal one real as1et, however, in that no amo=t of trai.Di.Da 
can aubatitute for experience. 
Formal, or classroom, traintq ia a poaaibtlity for improved 
trainina• eapecially 1n the u:rban areaa. The Boaton chapter of the Aaeri• 
ca Xaatitute of Banld.na 1a auppol"ted by all of the local baDlc.a. It offers 
a larp selection of eoUI"aea, taupt by p'tofeaaionala • after bank ina houra. 
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Thia iD.atrueU.on ia relativelJ itlapenaive an4 D.'UIUJ local bauka take ad• 
vaatqe of the couaea offered fot: theit: peraonnel. It haa one diaadvan-
taae in that claa1ea meet OD11 once a week and proareaa ia therefore alow. 
The Boaton chapter of the National Inatitate of Credit offers two proarams 
in credit mana&eaeut tlu:ouah the Bo-.. 1hlivera:l.tJ Division of Continuina 
Education. The prop-au ofterecl an a basic Aaeoc1ate Proaram and an ad-
vaucecl Pellow Awu4 lroaram. Becau~e the local ba:oke an4 Dun & Bl'adatreet 
cSo not aeceaaarilJ enclorae these Pl'OP' .. , tbe7 muat be taken on the _. 
plOJ••'• own tiu and at hia own expenae. 
Aa mentioned previou&lJ (chapter VII), the beat poaaib:I.U.tJ for 
tratntoa cre4it men appeara to be tbrouab the uae of the caae atudy method. 
It 1a relativelJ inexp8G8ive to operate, and it mar be seared to almost 
ay desired speed. It baa an a4vaatap ewer on•the-job train:l.q because 
a definite curriculum can be set up, ao that probletU beyond the scope 
of the pure anal7at ~ be studied. 
AIPIBDU A 
GUIDI QUISTIONS USIJ) TO D1TUVIEW TBI BARIC ANALYSTS 
1. Does the b&Dk use a written format of step-by•step directions for 
analyztna a credit riskf tf ••,.es," to what extent? 
2. What tools of credit analysis does the bank uset 
~teraal analysis 
Trend analysis 
Other (Explain) 
llatio analysis 
St.mdard ratios 
3. laDk the followiq factoJ:s used in evaluatina a creclit risk in the 
order of importance to the decision? 
Account balances Aaency reports 
Bonovina eape1:1ence Character information 
Capacity (financial statemeata) Other 
Tl'ade experience 
4. Bow JB.Ul1 yeu's previous statements are required of a new account 
for analysis purposes? 
5. To what extent does the baak use a character reference service 1 
6. Which of the followtna personal behavior patterns would definitely 
rule out a prospective acc.ouatt 
Over•iDdulaenc.e in liquor 
' Race track habitue Acquaintances of 
questionable charac.• 
ter 
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7. Which of the followina historical occurrences would rule out a 
proapective account? 
lanki'Uptcy 
Fraud 
Taktl:la of unearned discounts 
Fire (Arson) 
Litiption 
Tax lien 
Trade debts turned over for collection by an aaency 
8. Does the bank check trade referGCes in all cases t 
never? 
UDder special situations? 
9. What balances sheet or opezoati.D& ratios are no'E'IIl&lly computed by 
the baak analyst durtna the aaalysis? 
10. Does the bank make uee of the standarcl ratios • cd if "yea," who is 
the compilezo of the ratios? 
11. In coujunctien with the ratios, at what point do the ratios appear 
to become UDfavorable? 
12. 0\tezo what period of time mu.at a c-.any' 1 fin&DCial trend show a 
decline in order to be considered a eianificant detriment to the 
extensicm of credit t 
13. Bow larae 1'1Uat a decreaae in woddna C8pita1 be to be considered 
s1p1flcant'l 
14. A.a a aeneral rule what is the uxSaDD per cent of a firm' a worldns 
capital that the bank is villiq to extend on an unsecured loan 
baaiaf 
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15. What constitutes the difference between an unsecured aod secured 
loan relative to the size of the loan f Under what ccm.clitiona elMs 
the bank be&iu to look for security? 
UfiNJ)Il B 
GUIDI QUIST1018 USIJ> FOR INrllVIIWING DUlf & BIW)STUET ANALYSTS 
l. What toola of credit analyaia do ,_ uaet 
lnteraal aaalyais 
Staufard ratios 
Other (lxplaiu.) 
Jlatio analysis 
Trend aa.alyais 
2. 1lauk the follCMfiaa factor a u.aecl in evaluatin& a credit riak in 
order of importaoce to the deciaioaf 
Account balaacea Borrowing experience 
Character infocmation Trade experience 
Capacity (ftnaneial atatemeata) 
3. What of the followiq peraoaal behaviol' patterna obaerved in manqe-
ment would be cauae for a blank ~atina? 
Age 
... lace track habitue Acquaintaacea of quea• 
tionable character 
4. Which of the followina hiatorical oo.currencea would rule out a 
proapective ratina with a blaok ratia&t 
Bankruptcy 
Fraud 
Takina of unearned diacounta 
Fire (aracm) 
Litiaation 
Tax lien 
'true debts turned over to a collection qency 
•to• 
5. What balance sheet or operatins ratios are normally computed in the 
initial analysiaf 
6. Do you lUke uae of the atanclard ratios, and if "yea," who is the 
compiler of the ratioet 
7. In conjuaction with the ratioa, at what point do the ratloe appear 
to become unfavorable? 
8. OVer what period of time muat a comp&nJ•a trend show a decline in 
order to be considered aisnificaRtt 
9. Ia the ch-ae in trend of fina.cial statement compared in any way 
with the COiliiPaDY' a inOuatry or tbe national ecODOIIIY aa a vholet 
10. How larae must a decreue 1n wwtd.na capital be to be conaidered a 
detr~t to a credit ratinst 
11. What constitutes the differeace between the Dml & Bradstreet 
ratinp? (lxcellent • Good, Fair, Limited, Bli\'Dk.) 
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